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CRIMINAL LAW
TOWARD THE DECENTRALIZATION OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND
SELECTIVE DISINCORPORATION
BARRY LATZER*
I.

INTRODUCTION

When one surveys the growing body of criminal procedure cases
in which the decision is grounded in a state constitutional provision, a
rather startling trend becomes manifest.' It is increasingly evident
that at some time during the early years of the next century virtually
every significant federal constitutional criminal procedure right will
have been duplicated or expanded as a matter of state law by the appellate courts of most of the states. That is, the same rights that defendants now enjoy as a result of United States Supreme Court cases
construing the federal Bill of Rights, or an even broader state-lawbased version of those rights, will be established in most of the states
by cases construing state bills of rights. 2 Little if any thought has been
* Professor of Government, John Jay College of Criminal Justice and the Graduate
Center of The City University of NewYork. Ph.D. 1977, Massachusetts;J.D. 1985, Fordham.
I wish to thank the following for kindly reading and commenting upon various drafts of
this article: Paul G. Cassell, PeterJ. Galie, G. Roger McDonald, Daniel R. Pinello, G. Alan
Tarr, and Robert F. Williams.
I I recently completed such a survey. BARRY LATZER, STATE CONsTrrTONAL CRIMINAL
LAW (1995). Criminal procedure cases are defined as cases involving a claim based upon
one of the following provisions of the United States Constitution or their state constitutional equivalents: the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment Doublejeopardy or SelfIncrimination Clauses, or the Sixth Amendment.
2 Every state constitution has a bill of rights consisting of provisions that are usually
textually similar to the federal Bill of Rights, but in some instances are significantly different. It is now well-established that these state provisions may be interpreted more favorably
to rights-claimants than the analogous federal provisions. See California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35, 43 (1988) ("Individual States may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than does the Federal Constitution."). It
is also true, although less well-known, that the state provisions may be interpreted less favor-

BARRY LATZER

[Vol. 87

given to the implications of this development for constitutional law in
the United States, or on the relations between state courts and the
United States Supreme Court.3
For openers, consider this question: if defendants' rights are pro4
tected by state law, why is there a need for redundant federal law?
Why provide federal protections where state rights exist, especially in
light of the fact that the state rights are as broad or broader? This is in
part, of course, a question about the Supreme Court's incorporation
policy by which federal rights have been applied to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 5 The stock answer is
that together, the federal rights established through incorporation
and the rights established through interpretation of state constitutions afford a double-barreled protection for individual rights in
America, and we all benefit from such dual assurances. 6 Upon close
examination, however, rights-redundancy has distinct disadvantages.
There can be little question that incorporation forced the states
to adopt uniform procedures without regard to local needs. In the
decades since the 1960s, when the Supreme Court "selectively" incorably to rights-claimants. Barry Latzer, Four Half-Truths About State ConstitutionalLaw, 65
TEMP. L. REv. 1123, 1125-30 (1992).
Notwithstanding that state law may provide narrower rights than federal law, the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits enforcement of less-protective state law where the litigant is entitled to the broader protections of federal law. The
Supremacy Clause reads as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
S Of course, constitutional law embraces much more than criminal procedure, and it
would be worthwhile to explore the implications of state constitutional developments in
such areas as First Amendment rights, the right to procreational autonomy and Equal Protection law. This essay is, however, limited to an examination of state constitutional criminal procedure and its consequences. Criminal procedure is probably the central issue in
the majority of state constitutional cases. For a survey of state constitutional law that covers
non-criminal areas, see JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw. LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES (1992).
4 Normally perhaps, the question is turned around: why provide state protections
where federal rights already exist? This version of the question focuses on state protections, and usually leads to a discussion of the development of state constitutional law, a
development that has been amply covered in the literature. This article presents a more
provocative and rarely-asked question: do we still need the federal part of the redundancy?
5 The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause reads as follows: "[N] or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONsT.

amend. XIV, § 1.

William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HAtv. L. REv. 489, 503 (1977) ("[O]ne of the strengths of our federal system is that it
provides a double source of protection for the rights of our citizens.").
6
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porated nearly all of the criminal procedure rights in the Bill of
Rights,7 the state courts have had little choice but to give force to
these federal procedures (absent broader state rights). No matter
how costly, no matter how inefficient, no matter how difficult to implement, no matter how much injustice they might cause, and no matter how inappropriate to local circumstances they might be, the state
courts have had to give effect to these federal procedural rights. 8
These disadvantages of incorporation were acknowledged even in the
1960s, but they were believed to be outweighed by one important
value: equality. Whatever the disadvantages in stiflingstate uniqueness, independence, and freedom to experiment, the advantage of
uniform treatment of defendants throughout the United States, at
least with respect to the fundamental rights of the Bill of Rights,
seemed to justify incorporation.
But let us be candid. Incorporation was also predicated upon an
assumption-a very negative assumption-about the states, and especially about state courts. The assumption was that some state courts
were chronically, and virtually all state courts were occasionally, backward. Without the Supreme Court to stand over them, ready to review
and reverse, the state courts would fail to provide the minimal rights
that all defendants were entitled to at all times. In short, incorporation was motivated by the Mississippi Problem: the assumption that
the state bench was, at its worst racist and incompetent, and merely
competent most of the time.
This essay contends that the Mississippi Problem is history, that
7 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to
obtain favorable witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to
speedy trial); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (right to impartial jury); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront adverse witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1 (1964) (compulsory self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(right to counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 360 (1962) (cruel and unusual punishments); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule).
8 Although this essay will focus on incorporated procedures that do not establish or
protect fundamental rights, rulings that do safeguard fundamental rights may also require
a sacrifice of local needs. The impact of Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 117 (1970), is illustrative. Baldwin struck down a New York law providing trials before three-judge panels
instead ofjury trials for misdemeanants in NewYork City. The law was passed to cope with
the burgeoning case load in the city, and sought to afford a more efficient trial to defendants facing relatively light penalties (under one year incarceration). Consistent with its
earlier ruling in Duncanv. Louisiana,391 U.S. 145 (1968) incorporating the Sixth AmendmentJury Trial Clause, the Supreme Court struck the law down, imposing upon the states
the federal six-months rule (right to trial by jury where the authorized penalty is six
months or more). As a result, when the case load soared in New York City, jury trials, with
their many inefficiencies, became rare events, and guilty pleas became the norm. By ignoring the needs of the big city states and forcing them to establish the federal rule, the Court
effectively discouraged the states from affording misdemeanants any trial at all.
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the state courts are no longer rights-antediluvians, and that therefore
an entire set of assumptions underlying incorporation has eroded.
The proof of the change in the state courts lies in their eagerness to
protect federal constitutional rights, but even more, in the development of state constitutional law. State constitutionalism has not only
created rights-redundancy, it has undermined the very reasons for
that redundancy. It gives the lie to the assumption that the state
bench is rights-backward. Unlike federal constitutional law, which is
imposed upon the state courts, state constitutional law is a matter of
choice. Whereas state courts must enforce federal procedural rights
incorporated into due process, they need not provide equivalent state
constitutional rights. State constitutional rights need not be as protective as comparable federal rights, 9 and they certainly do not have to be
more protective, as they so often are. State constitutional law epitomizes the change in the attitude and orientation of state judges. It
shows that state courts are now every bit as rights-sensitive as the
United States Supreme Court, if not more so. 10
The thesis of this essay is that some of the federal-state fights redundancy is no longer justified. But contrary to those who mistrust
the state courts and oppose the development of state constitutional
law, this essay calls for an increased reliance upon state constitutionalism."1 The sounder course for American constitutional develop9 Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Supremacy Clause require that state
courts adopt federal doctrine when construing state constitutional provisions. California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S 35, 44-45 (1988) (California constitutional amendment eliminating
the state exclusionary rule does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause). Indeed, nothing in the United States Constitution compels any particular construction of state constitutional law, although some state courts have established, as is their
prerogative, a "lockstep" policy by which they routinely reverse-incorporate federal doctrine. E.g., People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 155-157 (Ill. 1984) (United States Supreme
Court interpretations of the Fourth Amendment provide presumptively correct interpretations of the analogous Illinois search and seizure provision).
10 This may appear to contradict a position I took in earlier publications, where I
pointed out that two-thirds of the state constitutional criminal cases were not expanding
rights. See BARRY LATZER, STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND CRiMiNALJUSTICE 157-71 (1991); Barry
Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State Court "Revolution" 74 JUDICATURE 190 (1991).

There is no contradiction. The fact that state constitutional caselaw largely imitates
Supreme Court cases does not show that the state courts are less rights-sensitive than the
Supreme Court. Moreover, the fact that one-third of the state constitutional caselaw
broadens rights suggests that the state courts are, in a significant number of cases, more
rights-sensitive. To assert that state courts are just as conservative as the Supreme Court is
obviously not the same as asserting that they are more conservative.
11 One opponent of state constitutionalism, James A. Gardner, contends that the development of state constitutional law has been inevitably marginalized by the collapse of any
meaningful state identity in the United States and the consensus that fundamental values
will be debated and resolved nationally. James A. Gardner, The FailedDiscourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. Rsv. 761 (1992). 1 suspect that Professor Gardner would therefore consider disincorporation a dangerous anachronism. The short answer to his position
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ment-startling as it may first seem-is that certain federal criminal
procedures should no longer be imposed upon the state courts.
This conclusion, however, is not based solely upon the existence
of the same rights in state law. In the first place, some state courts
have not adopted a great many federal rights as a matter of state law.
For their own reasons-perhaps ideological-some state courts have
discouraged the development of state constitutionalism. 12 Moreover,
it appears that no federal right has been adopted by every single state
on state law grounds. Therefore, there is not, at least at the present
time, complete state-federal rights redundancy. Absent incorporation, some procedures might not be imposed in some states at all.
The fact that a right is generally provided on state grounds
should not, however, be the only consideration in determining
whether that same right should also be provided by federal law.
Whether or not federal rights ought to be imposed upon the states,
and whether they ought to continue to be imposed, is a question of
the meaning of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and the authority of the Supreme Court over the states. The meaning of due process
is not determined by the ubiquitousness of a procedure in state law,
although that is a consideration; it is determined by the nature of the
federal rights that are imposed.
Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court has selectively incorporated
into due process most of the rights in the Bill of Rights. 13 Theoretiis that federalism and state differences are a part of the American values consensus, and
are enshrined in the United States Constitution. Consequently, despite the centralizing
tendencies in recent American history, reassertions of federalism-whether through the
devolution of federal functions to the states, the rise of state constitutional law, or the
disincorporation of criminal procedure law-are inevitable and non-threatening.
I expect there will also be opposition to disincorporation from-ironically-some of
the advocates of state constitutional development. To the extent that they have a liberal
rights-expansion agenda (see Earl M. Maltz, FalseProphet-JusticeBrennan and the Theory of
State ConstitutionalLaw, 15 HASTINGs CONST. L.Q. 429 (1988)), some of the champions of
state constitutionalism will be very uncomfortable with proposals to remove some of the
planks of the federal floor. I do not see how they will be able to reconcile in a principled
way their opposition to disincorporation with support for state court independence and
the development of state constitutional law. Are the state courts to be trusted to develop
criminal procedure law only if that law favors defendants?
12 See LATZER, supranote 10, at 159-64 for an account of state-by-state variations in the
development of state constitutional law. The most likely explanation for the failure of
some states to develop state constitutional criminal procedure, and for its relatively advanced development in other states, is that state constitutional development is associated
with rights-expansion. Conservative judges, who do not wish to encourage claims for
broader-than-federal rights, are apt to oppose the development of state constitutional
rights law. Liberaijudges favor it in contemplation of the same rights-expansive outcome.
State constitutional law need not, and usually does not, establish broader-than-federal
rights.
13 See cases cited supra note 7.
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cally, it did so because it found that these rights were "fundamental in
the context of the criminal processes maintained by the American
States." 14 In what may be called the post-incorporation era, the Court
applied to the states various subsidiary procedural requirements derived from these fundamental rights-the so-called bag-and-baggage.
Most of these procedural requirements cannot be defended as fundamental rights in and of themselves, nor are they necessarily essential
to the administration of fundamental rights. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court has simply assumed that such procedures are properly
a part of due process, without demonstrating that they are so. It will
be argued in this article that only those procedures that are both fundamental and required by the Bill of Rights, or are at least demonstrably essential to the implementation of a fundamental right in the Bill
of Rights, may be imposed upon the states. Where a procedure is
none of the above it is not a proper part of due process and the
Supreme Court has no authority to compel the state courts to adopt it.
Where a previously incorporated procedure is challenged and it cannot be proven essential to a fundamental right it should be disincorporated, by which I mean that the incorporation decision should
be reversed and the procedure should no longer be required by the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
As I hope to show, at least two criminal procedural rights merit
disincorporation: the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, and the
Miranda15 doctrine. Both procedures have been downgraded to prophylactic status. They offer one method of enforcing the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, respectively, but are not themselves essential to
the safeguarding of these provisions. They are not fundamental to
the American scheme ofjustice, nor are they essential to the enforcement of fundamental rights. Mapp' 6 and Mirandashould be reversed.
Startling as this proposal might seem at first, neither the values
underlying stare decisis nor the rights of defendants would be affected
as much as might be thought. Reversing Mapp and Mirandawill do
less than conservatives hope and liberals fear. It is not true that rever17
sals will suddenly eliminate these exclusionary rules in state courts.
14 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).
15 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
16 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule).
17 Nor perhaps in federal courts. If Mapp is reversed, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914), will still require exclusion in federal courts where there are Fourth Amendment
violations. Miranda's fate in federal court is less certain. Perhaps the doctrine could be
enforced under the Supreme Court's supervisory power, but an act of Congress, dormant
so far, provides that voluntary confessions are admissible in federal prosecutions even without Miranda warnings. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968). See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452

1996]

SELECTIVE DISINCORPORATION

What is apt to be forgotten, if it were known, is that both the exclusionary rule and the Mirandadoctrine are broadly established as matters of state law. To the extent that a procedure is provided in state
law, its abandonment as a federal matter is less likely to undermine
settled expectations. Of course, such reversals will undoubtedly touch
off a great re-examination of the issues as the state courts and legislatures come to realize that they are no longer bound by Mapp and Miranda. But to the extent that stare decisis seeks to assure that settled
expectations about the law are not disregarded, the widespread enforcement of Mapp and Miranda doctrines as matters of state law
should quiet fears of too sudden an upheaval.' 8
In reality, for both liberals and conservatives there is uncertainty
in disincorporation. No one can be sure what the state courts will do.
They may continue these procedures on state grounds; they may develop alternatives. But there is one great benefit that a failure to disincorporate denies: the flexibility to tailor criminal procedure to state
needs and local conditions. Without disincorporation this cannot be
done except (as a practical matter) to establish more demanding procedures. Flexibility, state experimentation, and federalism are the ultimate justifications for the existence of state constitutional law and
for its expansion. Centralization, uniformity/equality, and incorporation are grounded in the lingering perception that state courts are
backward and need an unalterable "federal floor." Perhaps it all boils
down to a question of trust. Can we now trust state tribunals to develop without the supervision of the Supreme Court a workable balance between defendant's rights and the community's need to
(1994) (declining to consider § 3501 because the Government takes no position on its
applicability).
18 Measured by the stare decisis considerations set forth in PlannedParenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992) (declining to overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973)), the arguments for reversing Mapp and Mirandaare strong. These considerations are whether (1) the "rule has been found unworkable;" (2) "the rule's limitation on
state power could be removed without serious inequity to those who have relied upon it or
significant damage to the stability of the society governed by the rule;" (3) "the law's
growth in the intervening years has left [the rule] a doctrinal anachronism discounted by
society," and (4) the rule's "premises of fact have so far changed in the ensuing two decades as to render its central holding somehow irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing with
the issue it addressed." Id. at 855.
Although the workability and doctrinal vitality of Mapp and Miranda are debatable,
both rules may be considered unworkable in the sense that they are now considered largely
ineffectual and unnecessary in regulating police misconduct. Both have been downgraded
doctrinally by the Court to mere prophylactics, and their continued application to the
states is inconsistent with the fundamental rights theory of incorporation. Furthermore,
the underlying factual premise of the cases-that state authorities are unable or unwilling
to control the police-is no longer tenable, and, for this same reason, reversal would pose
no serious damage to the stability of society or of the criminal justice system. See infraPart
IV.
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enforce the criminal law? If, as is contended here, the answer is yes,
then it is time to emancipate the state courts and enable the full
flowering of state constitutional law.
II.
A.

INCORPORATION REVISITED

INCORPORATION'S THEORETICAL FLAW

Under the incorporation doctrine, certain rights in the Bill of
Rights, originally restrictions on only the federal government, become, when "incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause, restrictions upon the state governments as well.1 9 The
test for determining which rights in the Bill of Rights were to be incorporated was to ask whether the right was "fundamental in the context
of the criminal processes maintained by the American States." 20 Thus,
"fundamentality" is the touchstone for due process, and obsolete or
unimportant portions of the Bill of Rights may not be imposed upon
2
the states as they are not "fundamental." '
The fundamentality theory of incorporation presented an acute
doctrinal problem for the Court in cases involving what may be called
subsidiary or secondary procedural rights. While all might agree that
the broad principles of the Bill of Rights ought to be nationalized,
what was to be done with the narrow procedural gloss derived from
these rights? In a word, was the "bag-and-baggage" also to be deemed
"fundamental?"
In the 1960s, Justices John Marshall Harlan, Potter Stewart and
19 Baron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), established that the Fifth

Amendment Taking Clause, and by implication the entire Bill of Rights, restricted only the
federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment, by its terms, restricts the states. It declares in pertinent part: "[N] or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1.
20 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).
21 The Third Amendment (restricting the quartering of soldiers) is a clear example of a
right too archaic to be fundamental. The Fifth Amendment right to grand jury indictment
has never been deemed fundamental, perhaps because it is considered less defendantprotective than a prosecutor's information and preliminary hearing, the charging procedure preferred by many states. The Tenth Amendment, though neither an obsolete nor
unimportant part of the Bill of Rights, creates states' rights and cannot therefore intelligibly be construed as a limitation upon the states.
On rare occasions the Court determined the parameters of due process without the
"fundamentality" test. See In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the "essentials of due process and fair treatment" required during the
adjudicatory stage of a juvenile proceeding) (citation omitted); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 482-5 (1965) (law prohibiting the use of contraceptives violates a right to
marital privacy found in the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause). In these cases, however, the Court was
not determining whether a right in the Bill of Rights was incorporated; it was merely reaffirming that due process was not limited to the Bill of Rights.
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Abe Fortas, and in the 1970s, Justices Lewis Powell, William Rehnquist
and Chief'Justice Warren Burger, all took the view that not every element of a selected right applies to the states to the same extent as to
the federal government. 22 Justice Harlan argued forcefully that incorporationism would compel the Court either to dilute federal guarantees in order to reconcile them with state practice, or force the
states to abandon perfectly fair procedures. 2 3 But the Court repudiated this position and held that the Bill of Rights has identical application against both the state and federal governments. 24 To hold
otherwise, Justice Arthur Goldberg contended, was to establish a
"watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the
Bill of Rights. It would allow the States greater latitude than the Federal Government to abridge concededly fundamental liberties pro25
tected by the Constitution."
Justice Harlan, later seconded by Justice Powell, 26 pointed out the
contradiction: "Whereas it rejects full incorporation because of recognition that not all of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be
deemed 'fundamental,' it at the same time ignores the possibility that
not all phases of any given guaranty described in the Bill of Rights are
necessarily fundamental." 27 If fundamentality is the measure of incorporation for each clause of the Bill of Rights, then should it not be the
standard for incorporating the specifics of each clause? It seems illogical to say in one breath that portions of the Bill of Rights may be too
insignificant to impose upon the states, and in the next that every
22 Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978) (Powell, joined by Burger and Rehnquist, dissenting); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 246 (1978) (Powell,joined by Burger and Rehnquist,
concurring);Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 375 (1972) (Powell, concurring); Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 172, 213-4 (1968) (Fortas, concurring- Harlan, joined by Stewart, dissenting); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408-9 (1965) (Harlan, concurring in the

result).
23 See, e.g., Harlan's concurrence in Williams v. F/orida,399 U.S. 117 (1970) (protesting
that the Sixth Amendment requires juries of twelve, not six, as the Court allowed as a
matter of due process in deference to state practice).
24 E.g., Grist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978) (Fifth Amendment attachment ofjeopardy);
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury); Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963) (Fourth Amendment right prohibiting unreasonable
search and seizure; the Court stated that "the standard of reasonableness is the same under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.").
25 Pointer,380 U.S. at 413 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
26 Concurring in the jury unanimity cases, Apodaca, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), and Johnson,
406 U.S. 356 (1972), Powell argued that the issue was the "fundamentality of that element
viewed in the context of the basic Anglo-American jurisprudential system common to the
States. That approach to Due Process readily accounts both for the conclusion that jury
trial is fundamental and that unanimity is not." Id. at 372 n.9 (concurring opinion) (internal citations omitted).
27 Pointer,380 U.S. at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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gloss on an incorporated right is per se fundamental. As Louis Henkin observed: "The suggestion that protections of the Bill of Rights
must in all cases be applied exactly to the states, if they be applied at
all, is difficult to support as a matter of constitutional language or of
the jurisprudence of the Court, or to justify on any other relevant considerations." 28 The sounder view-swept aside by the Court-is that
in order for an ancillary procedure to be incorporated it should be
determined to be fundamental in itself, or at least absolutely essential
to the realization of some more general fundamental right.
Although it is too late to reject the everyjot-and-tittle approach to
incorporating ancillary procedures, surely it remains open to disincorporate those procedures that have non-fundamental, non-essential status. Whereas, perJustice Goldberg, the Court seems to have assumed
that the jots and tittles are either themselves fundamental, or that they
are essential to the preservation of fundamental rights, an express
finding by the Court that a procedure is neither should be sufficient
to reduce its status. Indeed, if a procedure is neither fundamental
nor essential to the enforcement of a fundamental right, it is difficult
to see the basis for its continued imposition upon the states. This
point is developed in Part IV of this essay, where a standard for disincorporation is offered.
B.

INCORPORATION'S ANTI-STATE ASSUMPTIONS

Before considering disincorporation, however, we must further
explore the reasons for incorporation. Although rarely if ever acknowledged in Supreme Court cases, undoubtedly because of the impolitic nature of the assertion, incorporation surely rested upon a
measure of disrespect for state courts. At best there are indirect allusions, such as Justice Powell's reference to the "insensitivity of some
state courts to the rights of defendants" 29 in explaining why the Court
incorporated the right to counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright.30 Just prior
to Mapp v. Ohio,3 ' in an essay urging stepped-up application of the Bill
28 Louis Henkin, "Selective Incorporation"in the FourteenthAmendment, 73 Yale L. J. 74, 88
(1963).

29 Argersinger v. Hamlim, 407 U.S. 25, 65 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
30 One of the reasons for seeking a more definitive standard [for the appointment of
counsel] in felony cases was the failure of many state courts to live up to their responsibilities in determining on a case-by-case basis whether counsel should be appointed
But this Court should not assume that the past insensitivity of some state courts to
....
the rights of defendants will continue. Certainly if the Court follows the course of
reading rigid rules into the Constitution, so that the state courts will be unable to
exercise judicial discretion within the limits of fundamental fairness, there is little reason to think that insensitivity will abate.
Id. (citation omitted). Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
31 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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of Rights to the states, Justice Brennan implied that the state judiciary
was either unwilling or unable to cope with abuses of suspected
criminals:3 2 "[T] oo many state practices fall far short. Far too many
cases come from the states to the Supreme Court presenting dismal
pictures of official lawlessness, of illegal searches and seizures, illegal
detentions attended by prolonged interrogation and coerced admis33
sions of guilt, of the denial of counsel, and downright brutality."
Although Brennan's reference to "state practices" encompassed state
legislative acts, it is abundantly clear that he did not think that the
state judges would reform matters if left to their own devices.
Additional evidence of the Supreme Court's attitude toward the
state judiciary may be inferred from the dissents in the incorporation
cases-largely penned by Justices Harlan and Felix Frankfurterwhich vainly defended the states and the state courts3 4 against the impending federal onslaught. As Justice Harlan saw it, incorporation
threatened state control over the administration of criminal justice.
As the Court pointed out in Abbate v. United States, "the States under our
federal system have the principal responsibility for defining and prosecuting crimes." The Court endangers this allocation of responsibility
for the prevention of crime when it applies to the States doctrines developed in the context of federal law enforcement, without any attention to
the special
problems which the States as a group or particular States may
33
face.
Although Justice Harlan spoke of the states in general, his concerns
surely extended to those state officials with the responsibility for the
adjudication of criminal cases. The incorporationists, by contrast, did
not see any threat to the states. "[T]o deny the States the power to
impair a fundamental constitutional right is not to increase federal
power," observedJustice Goldberg, "but, rather, to limit the power of
both federal and state governments in favor of safeguarding the fundamental rights and liberties of the individual."3 6 This, of course,
begs the question whether the procedure at issue actually safeguards a
fundamental right The better explanation for the incorporation iulings lies in the attitudes of the majority Justices toward the state
bench. As a defender of incorporation suggested, "perhaps they
32 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. RE-v. 761, 773
(1961).
33 Id at 777-78 (citations omitted).
34 Harlan occasionally argued that the state court handling of an issue was superior to
the approach of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 33 (1964)
(Harlan, J., dissenting): "The Court's reference to a federal standard is, to put it bluntly,
simply an excuse for the Court to substitute its own superficial assessment of the facts and
state law for the careful and better informed conclusions of the state court."
35 Id. at 28 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
36 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 414 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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viewed local authorities as having forfeited any right to judicial deference by their continued failure to control lawlessness in law
37
enforcement."
More than anything the Justices said, the inherent logic of selective incorporation supports the view that it was the product of the
perceived "failure of state courts to deal effectively with governmental
intrusions upon the rights of the individual."3 8 By contrast with the
"fundamental fairness" approach to the Fourteenth Amendment,
which predominated in the first half of the twentieth century, incorporation sharply circumscribed the independence of the state
bench.3 9 Fundamental fairness had left it largely to the states to determine criminal procedure, with the Supreme Court stepping in only
in the (rare) event of a fundamentally unfair trial, or, as Justice Brennan once put it, in "only the most revolting cases." 40 Under the regime of fundamental fairness, the Supreme Court's role was
essentially negative; it stood ready to reverse offenses to the conscience of mankind, but not to affirmatively impose procedures upon
the states. The state courts were left to their own devices provided
they did not treat defendants in a fundamentally unfair manner.
By contrast, selective incorporation imposed upon the states an
entire range of procedures-nearly all of the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights along with all of their subordinate procedural gloss. The unspoken assumption of incorporation was that state decisionmakersespecially the state judiciary, which bears primary responsibility for
construing state bills of rights and establishing rules of criminal proce37 Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation:Revisited, 7 GEo. LJ. 253, 317 (1982).
38 Robert T. Sheran, State Courtsand Federalismin the 1980's. Comment, 22 WM. & MARY L.

REv., 789, 790-91 (1981).
39 The "fundamental fairness" theory asked whether a procedure is an essential requisite of a fair trial, or in Justice Benjamin Cardozo's famous epigram, whether the right is

"of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,

325 (1937).
40 Brennan, supra note 32, at 778. "Judicial self-restraint which defers too much to the
sovereign powers of the states and reserves judicial intervention for only the most revolting
cases will not serve to enhance Madison's priceless gift of 'the great rights of mankind
secured under this Constitution.'"
Under the fundamental fairness regime, by mid-twentieth-century, only two criminal
justice rights in the Bill of Rights were also deemed essential to due process. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (the "core" of the Fourth Amendment, but not the exclusionary
rule); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (the Sixth Amendment right to a "public trial").
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) imposed a right to timely appointment of counsel in
capital cases where the defendants were incapable of defending themselves, but the pre1950 Court made clear that this right to counsel was not the same as the Sixth Amendment
right. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (indigent defendant in noncapital state trial
who was not incapable of self-defense had no right to appointed counsel, whereas the same
defendant in a federal trial had such a right under the Sixth Amendment), rev'd, Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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dure-could not be relied upon adequately to protect criminal defendants. The main concern of the Warren Court was to equalize the
treatment of criminal defendants with respect to rights deemed "fundamental," and the interests of federalism were to be subordinated to
this concern. 4 1 Thus, whereas Brandeisian state experimentation was
laudable, it was not desirable when it came to procedures incorporated into due process.4 In large measure, the Tenth Amendment,
which reserves to the states authority to administer criminal justice,
was forced to take a back seat to the rest of the Bill of Rights.
By its very nature, incorporation established United States
Supreme Court hegemony over the state bench. As the ultimate interpreter of the federal Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court became the
final authority regarding the scope and nature of its guarantees; the
state courts were to be compelled to conform to national mandates
established by the Supreme Court, absent more protective state procedures. In the 1960s, and for the next two decades, as criminal procedure rose to the top of the Supreme Court's agenda, the Court
rendered dozens of decisions glossing the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and
Eighth Amendments. Each such decision established an imperative
for state proceedings, which the state courts could enlarge, but never
deny. Incorporation thus shifted the initiative for developing criminal
procedure law from the state courts and state legislatures to the
United States Supreme Court.
Why subordinate the state bench to the federal judiciary? The
most obvious-and, I submit, the best-answer is that the Justices simply did not trust their state counterparts. They believed that the state
judges either would not or could not adequately protect defendants,
and that the only sure way to reverse this was for the Supreme Court
itself to establish defendants' rights.
This mistrust is especially troubling in light of the tension between fundamental rights theory and the willy-nilly incorporation of
secondary procedures. For if, as the next section seeks to demonstrate, the Court's assumption about the states is no longer valid, there
can be little justification for continuing to impose upon them proce41 "The legitimate interests of federalism were far narrower for the selective incorporation Court of the 1960's than they had been for the Courts that applied the fundamental
fairness doctrine." Israel, supranote 37, at 315. For a review of the incorporationist Court's
attitudes toward federalism, see id at 314-25.
42 "While I quite agree with Mr.Justice Brandeis that '[i]t is one of the happy incidents
of the federal system that [a state may] serve as a laboratory, and try novel social economic
experiments,' I do not believe that this includes the power to experiment with the fundamental liberties of citizens safeguarded by the Bill of Rights." Pointer, 380 U.S. 400, 413
(1965) (Goldberg,J., concurring) (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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dural requirements that are not indispensable to the protection of
fundamental rights. In the next section, we examine empirical evidence that the Supreme Court's largely unspoken assumption about
state judicial incompetence is obsolete.
III.

STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RIGHTS-SENSITIVITY OF THE
STATE COURTS

A.

"PARITY" AND THE ALLEGED INSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY OF STATE
COURTS

The rapid growth of state constitutional law provides the strongest empirical proof to date that the assumptions about state court incompetence are simply not valid. Before examining the implications
of state constitutionalism, however, we briefly consider the empirical
evidence developed during another controversy over state courts-the
so-called "parity" debate.
The parity issue was whether the state courts were the equal of
the federal in protecting federal constitutional rights, and therefore
whether federal habeas corpus review should be curtailed. 43 The
habeas question is now probably moot, as Congress has cast a strong
vote of confidence in state courts by statutorily mandating, in federal
habeas review, deference to state court legal and factual determinations.44 But before this law was passed some interesting studies comparing state and federal courts were published, and they strongly
support the premise that state courts are vigorously preserving rights.
One such study, conducted by Michael E. Solimine and James L.
Walker, concluded that "the available empirical evidence confirms the
sensitivity of state appellate courts to the enforcement of federal
rights." 45 This study measured the upholding/denial of federal con43 The commentators call this use of the term "parity in its 'strong' sense." This definition asserts "the absence of a systematic difference in outcomes whether cases are allotted
to state or federal courts." Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal
Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. R.Ev. 609, 610 (1991). The "weak"
definition of parity asks whether "a litigant will receive a constitutionally adequate hearing
on a federal claim in state court." Id.
44 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, P.L. 104-132, tit. I, 110 Stat.
1214, 1264 (1996). SeeFelker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996) (upholding portions of the
Act). See also Stephen Labaton, New Limits on PrisonerAppeals: Major Shift of PowerFrom U.S.
to States, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1996, at BI: "The new habeas corpus law.., is a monumental
shift of power to the state courts from the federal judiciary."
45 Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, ConstitutionalLitigation in Federal and State
Courts: An Empirical Analysis ofJudicialParity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 213, 251 (1983)
[hereinafter Solimine & Walker, ConstitutionalLitigation]. See also Michael E. Solimine &
James L. Walker, Rethinking Exclusive FederalJurisdiction,52 U. Prrr. L. REV. 383 (1991);
Michael E. Solimine &James L. Walker, State CourtProtection of Federal ConstitutionalRights,
12 HARV. J. L. PUB. POL'Y 127 (1989). For a critique of the study, see Erwin Chemerinsky,
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stitutional rights claims in state appellate courts (both intermediate
courts and courts of last resort) and federal district courts between
1974 and 1980. For Fourth Amendment issues, which are of special
concern to this article, the state court performance was nearly identical to the federal: 30.2% of these claims were upheld in state courts,
46
33.3% in federal courts.
Another empirical investigation, Craig M. Bradley's study of the
appellate court decisions of nine states, concluded that Stone v. Powel's 47 restriction of federal habeas corpus review of state court Fourth
Amendment decisions did not generally diminish state court enforcement of the Fourth Amendment. 48 Indeed, collective data from six of
the states studied showed increases in support for Fourth Amendment
claims after Stone, and in only one state was there a falling-off of
support. 49
Viewing habeas corpus from a federal court perspective, we find
additional proof that state courts adequately protect rights. A study
directed by Victor E. Flango of the National Center for State Courts
revealed that federal habeas petitions from state prisoners (petitions
that go to federal district courts after state trial and direct appeal)
have extremely low success rates-under 5%.5o With federal courts
affirming the state court rulings at least 95 times out of 100, the analysts concluded that the "state courts are doing a good job in protecting federal constitutional rights." 51
In sum, the empirical studies strongly support the contention
that state courts are the equal of the federal in rights-protection. Despite the empirical evidence arrayed against them, however, some of
the commentators have insisted that the potentialfor state-federal judicial disparity remains because of the institutional deficiencies of the
state courts.
Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the FederalJudiciary, 36 UCLA L. REv. 233 (1988).
46 Solimine & Walker, ConstitutionalLitigation,supra note 45, at 243.

428 U.S. 465 (1976).
Craig M. Bradley, Are State CourtsEnforcing the Fourth Amendment? A PreliminaryStudy,
77 GEO. L.J. 251, 264 (1988) (examining nearly four hundred appellate court cases from
nine states on Fourth Amendment issues rendered in 1975 and 1986 in order to determine
the impact of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), which virtually eliminated federal habeas
corpus review of state court Fourth Amendment decisions).
49 M at 263. Bradley also claimed, however, that one and possibly three states of the
nine were not enforcing the Fourth Amendment. 1d.at 286.
47
48

50 NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, HABEAS CoRPus IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

86-88 (1994). This four-state (Alabama, California, New York, Texas) study actually found
a 1% success rate. Id. at 62. It reported data from the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts
that found a success rate of 5% in 1992. Id. at 88. The study found a 17% success rate for
capital petitioners. Id. at 86.
51 Id. at 89.
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The first of these institutional critics of the state courts was Burt
Neuborne, who contended that parity is a "dangerous myth." 52
Neuborne's strongest argument, seconded by Martin H. Redish, 53
goes to the institutional infirmities of the state judiciary. They contend that, compared with federal judges, the relative precariousness of
the job of state judge makes the state judiciary an uncertain defender
of constitutional rights, especially in the face of unfavorable
majoritarian pressures. 54 Neuborne puts the matter this way:
Federal district judges, appointed for life and removable only by impeachment, are as insulated from majoritarian pressures as is functionally possible, precisely to insure their ability to enforce the Constitution
without fear of reprisal. State trial judges, on the other hand, generally
are elected for a fixed term, rendering them5 vulnerable
to majoritarian
5
pressure when deciding constitutional cases.
We need to examine the realities, not just the formalities, of the
alleged precariousness of the statejudiciary. The selection and tenure
of state judges varies not only from state to state, but also, within each
state, from type of court to type of court.5 6 Generally, state judges are
subject to some sort of public approval, either through direct election,
57
or retention election following selection by a judicial commission.
52 Burt Neuborne, The Myth ofParity, 90 HARv. L.R. 1105, 1105 (1977).

Neuborne com-

pared state and federal t-ial courts, conceding that the parity of federal courts and state
appellate courts was a "much closer" issue. Id. at 1118 n.51. Neuborne's contention that
federal judges are more technically competent than their state counterparts is purely impressionistic, and he has recently repudiated his claim that they have a more rights-oriented "psychological set." See Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of ajudicialForum of
Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 797, 798 (1995). See alsoSandra Day O'Connor, Trends in the
Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts From the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22
WM. & MARY L. REv. 801, 813 (1981), in which then-judge O'Connor defended her state
judicial brethren against Neuborne's charges.
53 Martin H. Redish, JudicialParity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on
FederalJurisdictionand ConstitutionalRights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329 (1988).
54 I have written elsewhere about the "vulnerability" of state supreme court judges
when compared with their United States Supreme Court counterparts. Barry Latzer, California's ConstitutionalCounterrevolution, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES 149 (G.
Alan Tarr, ed. 1996).
55 Neuborne, The Myth of Parity,supranote 52, at 1127-28 (footnotes omitted). Redish
says much the same thing:
Under article III, federal judges' salary and tenure are protected; ... most state judges
do not receive such protection. Instead, they must stand for election or at least seek
reappointment, with all of the potential external financial and political pressures
which these factors imply. Moreover, neither their salary nor their tenure is insulated
from state legislative reduction. Can one realistically suggest that we can trust the
independentjudgment of such individuals in cases challenging the constitutionality of
state action?
Redish, supra note 53, at 333.
56 OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION

1993, at 32-43, 48-69 (1995) [hereinafter STATE COURT ORGANIZATION].
57 Thirty states select all or most of their judges by popular election. Id.
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In practice, however, public input is qualified in three ways: (1) by the
large number of judicial vacancies filled by appointment-even for
elected positions-due to widespread early retirements; (2) by the low
public interest and turnout in judicial elections; and (3) by the overwhelming number of incumbent reappointments, in part because of
lack of electoral opposition.5 8 By contrast, there is no direct public
input into federal judicial appointments. However, federal appointments are rife with partisan politics, ideological considerations, and
special interest campaigns. 59 In any event, the evidence that elected
60
judges are less rights-sensitive than appointed judges is in conflict,
and it cannot be concluded with certainty that the appointment process is more conducive to independence on the part of the federal
judges.
The terms of office of state judges are short when compared with
their federal counterparts, who serve for life while on good behavior.
Most state judges serve terms of eight years or less, more if they are on
courts of last resort. 6 ' Once again, however, the differences may not
be as great as they appear since state judges may generally succeed
themselves and incumbents are almost always reelected. 62 Moreover,
if a sitting judge does not intend to seek reappointment (assuming
58 HENRY K GucK, COURTS,PoLrrcS, AND JUSTICE 119, 122 (3d ed. 1993).
59 LAWRENCE BAUM, AMRIucAN COURTS, PROCESS AND POLICY 112 (3d ed. 1994). "The
greatest change in the criteria for selecting [federal] lower-courtjudges is the increasing
emphasis given to policy preferences. Historically, there has been wide variation in the
attention that [presidential] administrations gave to the views of their nominees. But ideological screening of candidates for [federal] judgeships has become standard practice in
the past three decades."
60 A recent major study of a sample of state courts, found that the formal method of
selecting state supreme court judges "significantly affect[s] judicial policy in several important areas of law." D. K PINELLO, THE IMPAcr OFJUDICIAL-SELECTION METHOD ON STATESUPREME-COURT POLICY. INNOVATION, REAGrION AND APATHY 129 (1995). But others found
that selection method made little difference. Bradley Canon, The Impact of Formal Selection
Processes on the CharacteristisofJudges-leconsidered,6 LAw & Soc'Y Rv. 579 (1972); Victor
Flango & Craig Ducat, What Differences Does Method of Selection Make: Selection Procedures in
State Courts of Last Resor4 5 JUsT.Sys.J. 25 (1979).
To the extent that state constitutionalism is associated with receptivity to defendants'
rights, there is evidence both supporting and denying a relationship between selection
method and rights policy. Among state courts that were most active in deciding cases on
state constitutional grounds (prior to 1990), five out of ten had elected appellate judges.
LATzER, supra note 10, at 162. On the other hand, three out of the four state courts that
(prior to 1990) most rejected United States Supreme Court doctrines in favor of more
protective state constitutional rights had appointed appellate judges. Id. at 164.
61 STATE COURT ORGANIZATION, supra note 56, at 32-43, 48-69.
62 GuCK,supra note 58, at 119. "Studies of individual states indicate that as many as
nine out of ten judges who sought reelection ran unopposed, and only a mere handful of
those with opposition were voted out of office." Id. Few state judges are rejected in retention elections. Susan B. Carbon, JudicialRetention Elections: Are They Serving Their Intended
Purpose, 64JUDICATURE 210, 213 (1980) (from 1934 to 1980 only thirty-three judges were
not retained).
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that this decision was not influenced by his stance on individual fights
or the reactions to it), it is not clear that the short term of office leads
to less sympathy for fights-claimants. On the other hand, for jurists
wishing to succeed themselves, having to stand for reelection fairly
often may sensitize one to majoritarian sentiments in ways that negatively impact upon counter-majority claims.
Setting aside defeat in regular or retention elections, or non-reappointment by governors, state judges are subject to legislative impeachment or milder legislative sanction ("address"), as well as
sanctions by judicial conduct commissions. By contrast, federal judges
can be removed only by Congress, although federal judicial councils
can impose other sanctions and recommend impeachment. 6 3 Legislative sanctions are relatively rare on both levels, and state judicial councils vary from state to state in their aggressiveness. 64 More
importantly, sanctions are usually imposed because of corruption or
malfeasance, and there is no reason to think that they are more likely
to be imposed against rights-oriented jurists.
There have been, in recent years, some striking examples of state
judges who were threatened with non-reelection or were actually defeated by the voters at least in part because of positions favorable to
defendants' rights. Most notable of the defeats were those of three
California Supreme Court justices, including ChiefJustice Rose Bird,
and that of Wyoming Supreme Court Justice Walter Urbigkit. 65 The
Bird episode was especially stunning because non-retention was unprecedented in the history of the state, and because the reason was so
clearly tied to dissatisfaction with her (and her two defeated colleagues') decisionmaking in a particular policy area, viz., criminaljustice. On the one hand, Bird's widely publicized defeat could hardly
fail to make an impression on other judges around the country who
are subject to voter approval. On the other hand, this message is
blunted because removal is so uncommon; most of the time most
judges are not vulnerable. More typical were the dismal failures to
unseat Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde in 1984, and Florida Supreme Court Chief Justice Ellen Barkett of the in 1992, both of
whom were also opposed in part on the basis of their criminal justice
63 The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 94
Stat. 2035, 28 U.S.CA §§ 1 notes, 331, 332, 372, 604 (1996), established regional judicial
councils for each federal circuit. Of course, Congress could abolish the lower federal
courts altogether, and can exclude certain types of cases from their jurisdiction. See infra
note 71.
64 BAUM, supra note 59, at 162-64.

65 See Latzer, supra note 54, passim regarding Bird and her two colleagues, Associate
Justices Joseph R. Grodin and Cruz Reynoso. Justice Urbigkit's defeat was reported in
Andrew Blum, Jurists,Initiatives on Ballot, NAT'L L. J., November 16, 1992, at 1.
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decisions.6 6 Moreover, the Bird court was unusual in its determinadon to thwart the public will as expressed through state law. 67
Overall, it must be concluded that state judges are much more
exposed to majority approval/disapproval than federal judges, even
though the exposure of the state bench is minimized in practice. Assuming that public accountability translates into attitudes more
favorable to the government and less favorable to the individual, then
on balance, at least in theory, federal courts appear to be the safer
repository for individual rights. It has not been clearly demonstrated,
however, that exposure to public disapproval results in less sympathy
for individual rights claims. Indeed, as the development of state constitutional law demonstrates, state court performance in protecting
rights has outstripped that of the Supreme Court.
Rights-protective though they may be, it must also be conceded
that state constitutional law decisions are themselves vulnerable to
public check in ways that federal constitutional caselaw is not. Rights
grounded upon state constitutions are more easily narrowed or eliminated than rights derived from the United States Constitution because
of the greater ease in amending state constitutions. Nearly all states
require only a simple majority of the popular vote to approve state
constitutional amendments proposed by state legislatures or state constitutional conventions, and seventeen states allow state constitutional
amendment by initiative, i.e., without the prior approval of a legislature or convention. 68 Consequently, there have been a superabundance of state constitutional amendments, some of which were
designed to reduce the rights of the criminally accused. 69 , Notable
amongst the latter were California's Proposition 8, which eliminated
state constitutional exclusionary rules, and Florida's forced linkage
66 Id. See Ronald K.L. Collins, Hans Linde and His 1984JudicialElection: The Primary,70
OR. L. Rav. 747, 764 (1991).

67 Despite the passage of two state constitutional amendments favoring capital punishment and carefully crafted statutes to facilitate them, the California Supreme Court under
Bird reviewed sixty-four capital cases and upheld the penalty in only six. Her court's prodefendant orientation in other criminal cases inspired Proposition 8, a state constitutional
amendment abolishing the California exclusionary rule. Latzer, supra note 54, at 157-58,
164-67.
68 Janice C. May, ConstitutionalAmendment and Revision Revisited, 17 PUBLIS:J. Fan. 153,
157 (1987). By contrast, the typidal amending procedure for the United States Constitution, pursuant to Article V, requires that an amendment be proposed by two thirds of both
houses of Congress followed by ratification by the legislatures of three fourths of the states.
Id. at 154. As a result, thirty-three federal constitutional amendments have been proposed
to the states in all of American history, twenty-six of which have been approved, whereas
some 8,000 state constitutional amendments have been proposed, over 5,000 approved. Id.
at 162.
69 Id. at 171 (citing Donald E. Wilkes, First Things Last: Amendomania and State Bills of
Rights, 54 Miss. L. J. 223, 232-235 (1984).

BARRY LATZER

[Vol. 87

amendment, limiting state constitutional search and seizure rights to
those established by the United States Supreme Court for the Fourth
Amendment. 70 Although federal constitutional rights are on much
firmer footing because of the difficulty in amending the United States
Constitution, Article III does give Congress certain rarely-used powers
over the federal bench, including the power to limit the Supreme
71
Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding the theoretical precariousness of state court
rights decisions, the fact remains, as is shown below, that the state
courts have been in the last few decades as protective or more protective than the United States Supreme Court. How can we account for
the anomaly that state courts are more accountable to popular majorities than federal courts, and have nevertheless been more committed
to individual rights? Four reasons may explain the phenomenon. (1)
The restraints on state courts are usually more hypothetical than real.
Turning out state judges because of their pro-rights decisions, and
amending state constitutions in ways that significantly narrow individual rights remain quite uncommon. Rose Bird is the exception that
proves the rule. (2) There has been strong support among state political elites within and without the judicial branch and at least grudging
mass tolerance for individual rights. This has provided a supportive
legal-political atmosphere. (3) The vast number of criminal cases
raising individual rights issues has led to the routinization of rightsenforcement, such as through suppression hearings, and this routinization has obfuscated the work of the courts. Along the same
lines, the complexity and narrowness of the issues has also blunted
what public opposition there might be to the expansion of individual
rights. Granting a motion to suppress evidence may impress the legal
community as an exercise in rights affirmation, but to the general
public it is a scarcely noticeable technicality. (4) The "new judicial
federalism," the post-1970 period of state rights expansion, has given
impetus to more pro-rights rulings by the state courts, in part by making state judges the focus of attention in the legal literature.
supra note 10, at 37-38.
71 Article III gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction "with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make," which has been construed to mean
that Congress may eliminate Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over cases dealing with
certain issues. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2. Congress tried this only once, during the Civil War
period, when it eliminated jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions. ExparteMcCardle, 74
U.S. 506 (1869) (upheld). Also, although Article III implies that Congress could abolish
lower federal courts altogether, it may not reduce judicial salaries-even during financial
exigencies as compelling as the Great Depression. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S.
516 (1933). Article III states that "[tiheJudges ... shall, at stated Times receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.
70 LATZER,
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If, despite their relatively greater public accountability, state
courts are in fact more rights-sensitive than the Supreme Court, the
structural critique of state courts loses much of its potency. It is difficult to credit speculation that popular accountability leads to less
rights-sensitivity in the face of so much empirical evidence to the contrary. The structural critique must therefore fall back on two arguments. The first is that the state courts differ from state-to-state,
rendering nationwide generalizations suspect. State judges with
greater vulnerability may still be expected to provide less hospitable
forums for rights claims, notwithstanding the national picture. The
second argument relies on conjecture about future developments,
viz., that majoritarian pressures may someday lead to state court backsliding on rights (i.e., whatever their present rights-orientation, state
court exposure to popular constraints may, in the future, cause a
change in attitude).
Regarding the first point state court proclivities to expand rights
do indeed vary from state to state, although these tendencies ebb and
flow over time. But the variation among the states in pro-defendant
decisions does not necessarily correlate with the vulnerability of the
state judges to public accountability. For instance, three states that
are very active in developing state constitutional law-Oregon, Texas
and West Virginia-provide for the election of state appellate
judges. 72 These states have made significant rulings expanding the
rights of the criminally accused, on such matters as automobile
searches, 73 Miranda rights74 and the right to counsel. 75 Moreover,
state judicial elections are not especially threatening; candidates often
72 STATE COURT ORGANIZATION, supra note 56, at 38, 40, 42. My earlier state constitutional law study found that the courts of last resort in Oregon and West Virginia were
among the top ten in rendering decisions based on state constitutional provisions. IATZER,
supra note 10, at 162. Although Texas was not on the list, my more recent study suggests
that it might well be included on an up-to-date list. See LATZER, supra note 1, passim. Concededly, however, making state constitutional law decisions is not synonymous with favoring defendants' rights. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, for example, adopted
federal doctrines in over 80% of its state constitutional decisions, and federal doctrine has
not been especially favorable to defendants in recent decades. LATZER, supra note 10, at
163-64.
73 Autran v. State, 887 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (Texas Constitution provides greater protection than Fourth Amendment in context
of inventory searches of automobiles).
74 State v. Randolph, 370 S.E.2d 741,743 (W. Va. 1988) (whether or not a suspect was
advised of the charges is, contrary to federal law, a factor in determining whether he intelligently and voluntarily waived his Mirandarights).
75 Brown v. Multnomah County District Court, 570 P.2d 52, 60 (Or. 1977) (en banc)
(extending the right to counsel to first offense drunk driving cases even though no incarceration could be imposed).
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run unopposed and almost always win. 76 The removal of ChiefJustice
Bird in California is atypical. Although a recent study found that appointed state judges were generally more sympathetic to criminal defendants' rights than their elected counterparts, that conclusion must
be considered provisional. 77 In short, there is only weak empirical
support for the assertion that some state judiciaries are structurally
less hospitable to defendants' rights.
As for the second point-the backsliding argument-it is purely
speculative. It is certainly true that there is considerable unpredictability regarding the role of the state courts. In 1960, who would have
predicted that within two decades, the state courts would be expanding rights beyond federal boundaries, and the Supreme Court
would decline to broaden those boundaries? For that matter, the role
of the Supreme Court and the lower federal tribunals has hardly remained constant; compare the Court of the early 1930s with the War78
ren era.
By the next century it is conceivable, even likely, that the posture
of the state judiciary will change again, although not necessarily on
the issue of defendants' rights. However, uncertainty about the future
role of state courts does not justify continued Supreme Court hegemony over the state judiciary. As the Court has repeatedly acknowledged, it has no supervisory authority over the state courts. 79 Its
authority is limited to interpreting the Constitution and federal law.
Where the Court is properly within its authority to require a procedure as a matter of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, the state
courts are compelled by the Supremacy Clause to comply. But where
the Court concedes that a procedure is not required by the Constitu76

GuCK,supra note 58, at 119.

77 PINELLO, supra note 60, studied six states, a rather small sample. He did not sepa-

rately examine states that select judges by merit plan or nonpartisan election-methods
used by over one-half of the nation. Nor did he look beyond the formal judicial selection
process. In many states, judges retire before the expiration of their terms and state law
provides for gubernatorial appointment of their replacements. GLICK, supra note 58, at
118. Consequently, judges who are officially exposed to public approval through elections
are insulated from it in practice. Pinello's sample of "elected" judges may actually have
been appointed, and therefore, he may have been comparing apples and apples.
78 For an overview of the Supreme Court's role over the course of American history see
ROBERT G. McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960).

79 E.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982) ("Federal courts hold no supervisory
authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension.") (citing Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 570 (1981) ("This Court
has no supervisory jurisdiction over state courts, and, in reviewing a state-courtjudgment,
we are confined to evaluating it in relation to the Federal Constitution."); Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23, 31 (1963) ("Mapp [v. Ohio] ...established no assumption by this Court of
supervisory authority over state courts... and, consequently, it implied no total obliteration of state laws relating to arrests and searches in favor of federal law.").
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tion, that it is no more than ajudicially created remedy, and that it is
not essential to the enforcement of a fundamental right, there is simply no warrant to continue to impose it upon the states. The United
States Supreme Court is not the guardian of the state judiciary. It cannot legitimately mandate national procedures simply out of fear that
some states might some day adopt different procedures that are less to
its liking. The mere potential rights-hostility of some state courts at
some time in the future is simply not a good enough reason to fasten a
procedure upon all of the states. Moreover, under the proposed disincorporation standards described in Part IV of this article,8 0 the
Supreme Court retains authority to prod foot-dragging states into
properly protecting fundamental rights. Lastly, even if disincorporation were to create a risk that the state courts will renege on their
individual rights mission, that risk is far outweighed by the advantages
of disincorporation. As detailed in Part V of this article, disincorporation will restore Supreme Court legitimacy, re-establish state authority
in criminal justice policymaking, a traditional area of state control,
permit greater state flexibility in criminal justice administration, and
encourage a full flowering of state constitutionalism. 8 1
To return one last time to the parity debate that launched this
section, it has now become so abundantly clear that state courts are
competent rights protectors that experts on federal court controls
over state administration ofjustice through habeas corpus and § 1983
litigation are now recommending that such controls should be considerably scaled back.8 2 Indeed, there is national support for this position as evidenced by the recent federal legislation curtailing federal
habeas review of state court rulings. 83 As will be demonstrated in the
next subsection of this article, state constitutional law offers compelling proof that rights are just as safe in the state forum.
B.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: REDUNDANCY AND BEYOND

State courts have made hundreds of decisions recognizing as a
matter of state law the same rights that the Supreme Court has acknowledged for the federal Constitution. 84 This says something significant about state courts because these state constitutional decisions
80 See infra text accompanying notes 147-152.
81 See infra Part V.A.
82 Joseph L. Hoffman & Lauren K. Robel, FederalCourtSupevision of State CriminalJustice
Administration,543 ANNALs AM. AcAD. POL & Soc. Sm. 154 (1996) (calling for a diminished
role for federal courts in state criminal cases through reform of federal habeas corpus and
Section 1983 (42 U.S.C. § 1983) litigation).
83 See supranote 44 and accompanying text.
84 LATZER, supra note 1, passim.
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were not mandatory. It is true that the Supremacy Clause requires the
enforcement of federal rights where they are broader than state
rights, but enforcing a more protective federal right does not establish
the right as a matter of state constitutional law.8 5 The Supremacy
Clause does not demand the incorporation in reverse of federal rights
into state constitutional law. State constitutions may be interpreted
however state courts wish, even to provide less protection for defendants than the federal Constitution, in which case the state courts must
give force to the broader federal guarantee. Thus, interpreting state
constitutional provisions in the same way as similarly-worded federal
constitutional provisions-i.e., adopting, or reverse-incorporating federal doctrines-is merely one of a range of interpretive options for
the state courts.
The widespread resort to reverse-incorporation led to criticism of
the state courts for "lockstepping," the seemingly unreflective copying
of Supreme Court doctrines. 86 This criticism overlooks the potential
impact of these rulings upon constitutional law in the United States.
State reverse-incorporation decisions have created an entire corpus of
rights law quite independent of federal constitutional law.8 7 If suddenly, a radical United States Supreme Court were to reverse the major defendants' rights decisions of the last forty years there would be a
remarkable degree of continuity in American criminal procedure
law.8 8 Virtually all federal constitutional doctrines have been reverse85 Latzer, supra note 2, at 1125-30. State courts are not always aware of the distinction.
There are occasional statements in state cases suggesting that state law cannot be narrower
than federal. See id at 1126.
86 For a critique of state constitutional "lockstepping" see Gardner, supra note 11, at
791-92. Some of the criticism of "lockstepping" may be ideologically motivated, reflecting
the commentator's disappointment that state constitutional law was not used to expand
rights. To the contrary, however, the fact that state constitutionalism is not an unprincipled contrivance for establishing a liberal agenda adds to its legitimacy.
87 Some of the case law is "law-ambiguous," i.e., it cannot easily be determined from the
court opinion whether the decision rests on federal constitutional law, state constitutional
law, or both. See, e.g., State v. Detweiler, 544 N.W.2d 83 (Neb. 1996) (not clear that the

court was applying the state doublejeopardy clause). This makes it hard to decide whether

or not a state constitutional decision has indeed been rendered. Law-ambiguity suggests
indifference to the creation of an independent body of state constitutional law. However,
law-ambiguity may simply be motivated by a desire to enhance state judicial power. It does
so in at least three ways. First, it reduces the likelihood of United States Supreme Court
review of state cases by blurring the distinction between federal and state grounds. The
Court struck back (ineffectually) by establishing a presumption that independent state
grounds do not exist. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). Secondly, law-ambiguity
enables state courts to back off from troublesome rulings by claiming in subsequent cases
that the state constitution was not really relied on. Third, it provides federal "cover" for
controversial state court decisions; the judges can claim that they were simply extending
Supreme Court principles.
88 Some might contend that this article endorses such a radical reduction in rights
protection. To the contrary, however, this article favors removing from Fourteenth
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incorporated into state constitutional law, often in a sizable number of
states. In addition, nearly every one of these federal doctrines has
been rejected by several states in favor of broader protections
grounded upon state constitutional law. In the event that Supreme
Court mandates are eliminated, these rights-adopting or rights-expanding states will enforce the very same or broader rights as those
heretofore guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
Concededly, not all federal doctrines have been adopted on state
constitutional grounds by all states; for each federal doctrine there are
some states that do no more than fulfill their obligations under the
Supremacy Clause to enforce federal rights. Consequently, if certain
federal due process mandates were to be eliminated there would be
no protection for those rights in some states. Although the list of nonadopting states varies with the issue, there is a recurring pattern.
Some states, e.g., Alabama, Georgia, and Virginia, are simply not as
active as others in developing their state constitutional jurisprudence.
This does not necessarily indicate rights-insensitivity, however. It must
be remembered that under current federal hegemony, reverse-incorporation appears to be of no practical significance; who needs state
constitutional rights where federal protections must be enforced by
the states? Moreover, because state constitutional law is commonly
associated with rights-expansion, and its development invites litigation
pressure to broaden rights, some of the more conservative state courts
may wish to signal that they approve of the status quo in criminal procedure law, or do not wish to "tilt" further in favor of defendants.
What these "inactive" states will do if given greater responsibility to
determine the law for themselves is not certain. Disincorporation
thus creates the possibility that some states will never give force to the
disincorporated right. However, disincorporation also creates the
possibility that state courts will acknowledge state constitutional rights
that did not previously exist in their states.
Notwithstanding the above, a remarkable number of states have
established state constitutional rights that are the equivalent of or exceed federal rights.8 9 To demonstrate the extent of this federal-state
constitutional redundancy I have collected search and seizure decisions grounded in state constitutional law that have adopted or broadened federal constitutional requirements. The left-hand side of Table
I below lists various law enforcement activities regulated by the Fourth
Amendment Due Process mandates only those rights that are not fundamental to the

American scheme of justice, or essential to the preservation of those rights. As will be
shown, disincorporation is not likely to markedly impair defendants' rights. See infra Part
IV.
89 See infra notes 90-135 and accompanying text.
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Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. For
each regulated activity Table 1 provides on the right-hand side a count
of the states that have either adopted the federal requirements on the
basis of independent state constitutional law or have provided a more
defendant-protective state constitutional procedure. 90
As will be seen, the level of redundancy is quite impressive; in
some instances, over 70% of the states provide shadow state constitutional rights.
TABLE 1
INDEPENDENT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON SELECTED
LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES THAT ARE SUBJECT TO FOURTH
AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS

Activity Subject to FourthAmendment
Limitations
1. Home entries to effect felony
arrests 9'

2.

Seizures of items in "plain view"9'

3.
4.
5.

Searches pursuant to consent95
97
"Seizures" of the person
"Stops" and brief detentions of
the person
"Stops" of vehicles (non-

6.

roadblock)
7.

Number of States Regulating on State
ConstitutionalBasis
Twenty-four 92 (48% of states)
Eighteen9 4 (36% of states)
Twenty-three" (46% of states)
Nineteen 98 (38% of states)
Thirty-six'00 (72% of states)
Twenty-three' 0 ' (46% of states)

101

(42% of states)

Protective (weapons)
searches of
3

Twenty-one'

Vehicle impoundment and
inventory °
of persons incident to
Searches
0 7

Nineteen 0 6 (38% of states)

Vehicle searches incident to

Twenty-one" 0 (42% of states)

the person1

8.
9.

Nineteen

8

(38% of states)

arrest'

10.

arrest'

11.

09

Vehicle searches pursuant to the
"automobile exception""'

Thirty-five"' (70% of states)

9' See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
92 See State v. Martin, 679 P.2d 489, 494 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc); State v. Shepherd, 798
S.W.2d 45, 49 (Ark. 1990); People v. Williams, 774 P.2d 146, 162 (Cal. 1989); People v.
Drake, 785 P.2d 1257, 1262 (Colo. 1990); State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 1225, 1230 (Conn.
1992); Mason v. State, 534 A.2d 242, 252 (Del. 1987); State v. Bradley, 679 P.2d 635, 638
90 The coverage is limited to search and seizure cases decided through 1995; other
criminal procedure issues are not included. State court decisions based on statutory construction are also omitted, even though they may provide significant rights on the basis of
state law. Although the courts of a particular state may have reached the same general
issue more than once, in determining the right-hand column figures, no state was counted
more than once for each issue.
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(Idaho 1983); People v. Foskey, 554 N.E.2d 192, 196 (Ill. 1990); State v. Holtz, 300 N.W.2d
888, 891 (Iowa 1981); State v. Ruden, 774 P.2d 972, 974 (Kan. 1989); State v. Platten, 594
P.2d 201, 202 (Kan. 1979); State v. Brown, 387 So. 2d 567, 569 (La. 1980); State v. Boilard,
488 A.2d 1380, 1383 (Me. 1985); People v. Oliver, 338 N.W.2d 167, 169 (Mich. 1983); State
v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn. 1992); State v. Lohnes, 344 N.W.2d 605, 610
(Minn. 1984); State v. Dow, 844 P.2d 780, 784 (Mont. 1992); State v. Carlson, 644 P.2d 498,
502 (Mont. 1982); State v. Santana, 586 A.2d 77, 78 (N.H. 1991); State v. Houtenbrink, 539
A.2d 714, 715 (N.H. 1988); State v. Jones, 503 A.2d 802, 805 (N.H.1985); State v. Henry,
627 A.2d 125, 128 (NJ. 1993); State v. Olson, 598 P.2d 670, 671 (Or. 1979); Duquette v.
Godbout, 471 A.2d 1359, 1361 (RI. 1984); Vasquez v. State, 739 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1987) (en banc); State v. Holeman, 693 P.2d 89, 91 (Wash. 1985) (en banc); State v.
Schofield, 331 S.E.2d 829, 834 (W. Va. 1985); State v. Boggess, 340 N.W.2d 516, 520 (Wis.
1983); Laasch v. State, 267 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Wis. 1978); Brown v. State, 738 P.2d 1092,
1094 (Wyo. 1987); Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935, 940 (Wyo. 1983).
9
3 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323
(1987); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 445 (1971).
94
See Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 733 (Alaska 1979); Stout v. State, 898 S.W.2d 457, 459
(Ark. 1995); State v. Meyer, 893 P.2d 159, 162-63 (Haw. 1995); State v. Barnett, 703 P.2d
680, 683 (Haw. 1985); State v. Stachler, 570 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Haw. 1977); People v.
Mitchell, 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (Ill. 1995); Clarkv. State, 498 N.E.2d 918, 921 (Ind. 1986);
Wilson v. State, 606 N.E.2d 1314 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 777
S.W.2d 876, 877 (Ky. 1989); State v. Ellis, 657 So. 2d 341, 359 (La. Ct. App. 1995);
Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 409 N.E.2d 719, 725 (Mass. 1980); State v. Hembd, 767 P.2d 864,
867 (Mont. 1989); State v. Murray, 598 A.2d 206, 207 (N.H. 1991); State v. Ball, 471 A.2d
347, 350 (N.H. 1983); State v. Bruzzese, 463 A.2d 320, 325 (NJ. 1983); State v. Peterson,
834 P.2d 488, 490 (Or. App. 1992); Sneed v. State, 423 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tenn. 1968);
Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), overned by Heitman v. State, 815
S.W.2d 681, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); State v. Austin, 584 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1978);
State v. Bell, 737 P.2d 254, 256-57 (Wash. 1987); State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96, 105 (Wash.
1982); State v. Guy, 492 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Wis. 1992); McDermott v. State, 870 P.2d 339,
343 (Wyo. 1994).
95
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
9 See Guidry v. State, 671 P.2d 1277, 1282 (Alaska 1983); King v. State, 557 S.W.2d 386, 388
(Ark. 1977); People v. Santistevan, 715 P.2d 792, 794 (Colo. 1986); State v.Jones, 475 A.2d
1087, 1090 (Conn. 1984); State v. Kearns, 867 P.2d 903, 906 (Haw. 1994); State v. Quino,
840 P.2d 358, 361 (Haw. 1992); State v. Post, 573 P.2d 153, 155 (Idaho 1978); Pirtle v.
State, 323 N.E.2d 634, 638 (Ind. 1975); State v. Owen, 453 So. 2d 1202, 1205 (La. 1984);
State v. Barlow, 320 A.2d 895, 899 (Me. 1974); Gamble v. State, 567 A.2d 95, 97 (Md. 1989);
Jones v. State ex rel. Miss. Dep't of Public Safety, 607 So. 2d 23, 24 (Miss. 1991); State v.
Horn, 357 N.W.2d 437, 441-42 (Neb. 1984); State v. Osborne, 402 A.2d 493, 497 (N.H.
1979); State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 67 (NJ. 1975); State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 455, 458
(N.M. Ct. App. 1994); People v. Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575, 582 (N.Y. 1976); State v. Little,
154 S.E.2d 61, 65 (N.C. 1967); State v. Patterson, 642 N.E.2d 390, 392 (Ohio App. Ct.
1993); State v. Flores, 570 P.2d 965, 967 (Or. 1977) (en banc); Rice v. State, 548 S.W.2d
725, 728 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah Ct. App. 1994);
State v. Zaccaro, 574 A.2d 1256, 1259 (Vt. 1990); State v. Rodgers, 349 N.W.2d 453, 455
1984).
9(Wis.
17 See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567
(1988); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (plurality opinion).
98
See Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 360 (Alaska 1983); In reJames D. 741 P.2d 161, 165
(Cal. 1987); State v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 1300, 1308 (Conn. 1992); Bostick v. State, 554 So.
2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 1989), rev'd, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); State v. Kearns, 867
P.2d 903, 906 (Haw. 1994); State v. Quino, 840 P.2d 358, 361 (Haw. 1992); State v.
Banbridge, 787 P.2d 231, 234 (Idaho 1990); State v. Tucker, 626 So. 2d 707, 710 (La.
1993); Commonwealth v. Cao, 644 N.E.2d 1294, 1295 (Mass. 1995); Commonwealth v.
Borges, 482 N.E.2d 314, 316 (1985); People v. Manion, 457 N.W.2d 623 (Mich. 1990)
(plurality opinion); In re E.DJ., 502 N.W.2d 779, 781 (Minn. 1993); State v. Twohig, 469
N.W.2d 344, 353 (Neb. 1991); State v. Cote, 530 A.2d 775, 778 (N.H. 1987); State v.
Tucker, 642 A.2d 401, 404 (NJ. 1994); State v. Farmer, 424 S.E.2d 120, 130 (N.C. 1993);
State v. Smith, 544 N.E.2d 239, 241 (Ohio 1989); State v. Holmes, 813 P.2d 28, 31 (Or.
1991); State v. Pully, 863 S.W.2d 29 (Tenn. 1993); Gearing v. State, 685 S.W.2d 326, 328
(Tex. Crim. App. 1985); State v.Jones, 456 S.E.2d 459, 461 (W. Va. 1995).
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See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

100 See Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 46 (Alaska 1976); State v. Ochoa, 544 P.2d 1097, 1099

(Ariz. 1976) (en banc); People v. Aldridge, 674 P.2d 240, 242 (Cal. 1984); People v.
Carlson, 677 P.2d 310, 312 (Colo. 1984); State v. Lamme, 579 A.2d 484 (Conn. 1990); State
v. Prouse, 382 A.2d 1359, 1362 (Del. 1978); Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1155 (Fla.
1989), rev'd, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); State v. Ortiz, 683 P.2d 822, 825 (Haw.
1984); State v. Gallegos, 821 P.2d 949, 951-952 (Idaho 1992); Rutledge v. State, 426 N.E.2d
638, 642 (Ind. 1981); State v. Scott, 409 N.W.2d 465, 467 (Iowa 1987); State v. Vistuba, 840
P.2d 511, 514 (Kan. 1992); Moresi v. State, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1084 (La. 1990); State v.
Griffin, 459 A.2d 1086, 1089 (Me. 1983); Commonwealth v. Lyons, 564 N.E.2d 390, 392
(Mass. 1990); People v. Faucett, 499 N.W.2d 764 (Mich. 1993); State v. McKinley, 232
N.W.2d 906 (Minn. 1975); State v.Johnson, 504 S.W.2d 23, 24 (Mo. 1974); State v. Morris,
749 P.2d 1379, 1383 (Mont. 1988); State v. Colgrove, 253 N.W.2d 20, 21 (Neb. 1977); State
v. Kennison, 590 A2d 1099, 1100 (N.H. 1991); State v. Brodeur, 493 A.2d 1134, 1137 (N.H.
1985); State v. Davis, 517 A.2d 859, 861 (NJ. 1986); State v. Reynolds, 890 P.2d 1315, 1316
(N.M. 1995); People v. Bennett, 519 N.E.2d 289, 291 (N.Y. 1987); State v. Thordarson, 440
N.W.2d 510, 512 (N.D. 1989); State v. Andrews, 565 N.E.2d 1271, 1272 (Ohio 1991); State
v. Ehly, 854 P.2d 421, 428 (Or. 1993); Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 614 A.2d 1378, 1379
(Pa. 1992) (dicta); State v. Tavarez, 572 A.2d 276, 278 (R-I. 1990); State v. Pully, 863 S.W.2d
29 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Brabson, 899 S.W.2d 741, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); State v.
Siergiey, 582 A.2d 119, 120 (VL 1990); State v. Williams, 689 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Wash. 1984)
(en banc); State v. Choat, 363 S.E.2d 493, 496 (W. Va. 1987); State v. Richardson, 456
N.W.2d 830, 833 (Wis. 1990); Goettl v. State, 842 P.2d 549, 557 (Wyo. 1992).
101See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
102 See Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 46 (Alaska 1976); State v. Ochoa, 544 P.2d 1097, 1099
(Ariz. 1976) (en banc); People v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1984) (dicta); State v.
Lamme, 579 A.2d 484, 486 (Conn. 1990); State v. Prouse, 382 A.2d 1359, 1362 (Del. 1978);
State v.Johnson, 561 So. 2d 1139, 1141-42 (Fla. 1990); State v. Gallegos, 821 P.2d 949, 95152 (Idaho 1991); Rutledge v. State, 426 N.E.2d 638, 642 (Ind. 1981); State v. Scott, 409
N.W.2d 465, 467 (Iowa 1987); State v. Vistuba, 840 P.2d 511, 514 (Kan. 1992); State v.
Griffin, 459 A.2d 1086, 1089 (Me. 1983); State v. McKinley, 232 N.W.2d 906, 909 (Minn.
1975); State v. Childs, 495 N.W.2d 475, 479 (Neb. 1993); State v. Brodeur, 493 A.2d 1134,
1137 (N.H. 1985); People v. Bennett, 519 N.E.2d 289, 291 (N.Y. 1987); State v.
Thordarson, 440 N.W.2d 510, 512 (N.D. 1989); State v. Tavarez, 572 A.2d 276, 278 (R.I.
1990); State v.Jewett, 532 A.2d 958, 961 (Vt. 1987); State v. Kennedy, 726 P.2d 445, 447-48
(Wash. 1986) (en banc); State v. Richardson, 456 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Wis. 1990); Goettl v.
State, 842 P.2d 549, 557 (Wyo. 1992).
10 SeeMinnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979);
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
'0' See Ozenna v. State, 619 P.2d 477, 479 (Alaska 1980); People v. Scott, 546 P.2d 327, 333
(Cal. 1976) (en banc); People v. Tate, 657 P.2d 955, 958 (Colo. 1983) (en banc); State v.
Dukes, 547 A.2d 10, 14 (Conn. 1988); State v. Ortiz, 683 P.2d 822, 825 (Haw. 1984); State v.
Post, 573 P.2d 153, 155 (Idaho 1978); People v. Mitchell, 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1017-20 (I1.
1995); C.D.T. v. State, 653 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (Ind. CL App. 1995); State v. Ruffin, 448 So.
2d 1274 (La. 1984) (dicta); People v. Nelson, 505 N.W.2d 266, 269 n.3 (Mich. 1993)
(dicta); State v. Johnson, 504 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Mo. 1974); State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710, 714
(N.H. 1990) (dicta); State v. Valentine, 636 A.2d 505, 508 (NJ. 1994); People v. Diaz, 612
N.E.2d 298, 300 (N.Y. 1993); State v. Andrews, 565 N.E.2d 1271, 1273 n.1 (Ohio 1991);
State v. Bates, 747 P.2d 991, 993-94 (Or. 1987); State v. Tavarez, 572 A.2d 276, 278 (R.I.
1990); Davis v. State, 829 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc); State v.
Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96, 101 (Wash. 1982); State v. Hlavacek, 407 S.E.2d 375, 380 (W. Va.
1991); State v. Guy, 492 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Wis. 1992).
10" See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
106 See State v. Daniel, 589 P.2d 408, 416 (Alaska 1979); State v. Wells, 539 So. 2d 464, 469
(Fla. 1989); Wagner v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 352, 356 (Ky. 1979), rev'd inpart Estep
v. Commonwealth, 663 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. 1983); State v. Sims, 426 So. 2d 148, 153 (La.
1983); Commonwealth v. Bishop, 523 N.E.2d 779, 780 (Mass. 1988); People v. Toohey, 475
N.W.2d 16, 24 (Mich. 1991); State v. Sawyer, 571 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Mont. 1977); State v.
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209 n.2 (N.D. 1990); Starks v. State, 696 P.2d 1041, 1042 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); State v.
Atkinson, 688 P.2d 832, 835 (Or. 1984); State v. Flittie, 425 N.W.2d 1, 4 (S.D. 1988); State
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v. Lunsford, 655 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Tenn. 1983); Drinkard v. State, 584 S.W.2d 650, 654
(Tenn. 1979); Autran v. State, 887 S.W.2d 31, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (plurality
opinion); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985); State v. Williams, 689 P.2d 1065,
1070 (Wash. 1984); State v. Perry, 324 S.E.2d 354, 360 (W. Va. 1984); State v. Goff, 272
S.E.2d 457, 460 (W. Va. 1980).
107 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
101 See Zehrung v. State, 569 P.2d 189, 199 (Alaska 1977); State v. Dukes, 547 A.2d 10, 22
(Conn. 1988); State v. Barrett, 701 P.2d 1277, 1280 (Haw. 1985); State v. Post, 573 P.2d
153, 155 (Idaho 1978); People v. Hoskins, 461 N.E.2d 941, 945 (Ill. 1984); State v. Breaux,
329 So. 2d 696, 698-700 (La. 1976); State v. Paris, 343 A.2d 588, 590 (Me. 1975);
Commonwealth v. Madera, 521 N.E.2d 738, 740-41 (Mass. 1988); People v. Chapman, 387
N.W.2d 835, 838 (Mich. 1986); Shell v. State, 554 So. 2d 887 (Miss. 1989) (dicta); State v.
Jellison, 769 P.2d 711, 712-13 (Mont. 1989); State v. Farnsworth, 497 A.2d 835, 839 (N.H.
1985); State v. Barton, 439 P.2d 719, 721-22 (N.M. 1968); State v. Caraher, 653 P.2d 942,
946 (Or. 1982); Rogers v. State, 774 S.W.2d 247, 264 (Tex. Grim. App. 1989) (en banc);
State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 1976); State v. Ringer, 674 P.2d 1240, 1242 (Wash.
1983); Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478, 481 (Wyo. 1985).
"0See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
110 See Stout v. State, 898 S.W.2d 457, 460 (Ark. 1995); People v. McMillon, 892 P.2d 879,
885 (Colo. 1995); State v. WaIler, 612 A.2d 1189, 1192 (Conn. 1992); State v. Kopsa, 887
P.2d 57, 64 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994); State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982);
People v. Ragland, 385 N.W.2d 772, 774 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Greenwald, 858
P.2d 36 (Nev. 1993); State v. Sterndale, 656 A.2d 409, 411-12 (N.H. 1995); State v. Pierce,
642 A.2d 947, 959 (NJ. 1994); People v. Blasich, 541 N.E.2d 40, 43 (N.Y. 1989) (dicta);
State v. Kunkel, 455 N.W.2d 208, 209 n.2 (N.D. 1990); State v. Hensel, 417 N.W.2d 849
(N.D. 1988); State v. Brown, 588 N.E.2d 113, 115 (Ohio 1992); State v. Kirsch, 686 P.2d
446, 448 (Or. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Rice, 327 N.W.2d 128, 131 (S.D. 1982); Osban v.
State, 726 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); State ex reL K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044, 104647 (Utah 1981); State v. Stroud, 720 P.2d 436, 440 (Wash. 1986); State v. Flint, 301 S.E.2d
765, 772 (W. Va. 1983); State v. Fry, 388 N.W.2d 565 (Wis. 1986) (construing a Wisconsin
statute).
"I See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
11 See Wickliffe v. State, 527 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Ark. 1975) (dicta); People v. Edwards, 836
P.2d 468, 472 (Colo. 1992) (en banc); State v. Miller, 630 A.2d 1315, 1322 (Conn. 1993);
State v. Dukes, 547 A.2d 10, 22 (Conn. 1988); Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind.
1995); Murrell v. State, 421 N.E.2d 638, 640 (Ind. 1981); State v. Olsen, 293 N.W.2d 216,
219 (Iowa 1980); State ex reL Love v. One 1967 Chevrolet El Camino, 799 P.2d 1043 (Kan.
1990); Estep v. Commonwealth, 663 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Ky. 1983); State v. Tatum, 466 So. 2d
29, 30-31 (La. 1985); State v. Bouchles, 457 A.2d 798, 801 (Me. 1983) (dicta);
Commonwealth v. Moses, 557 N.E.2d 14, 19 (Mass. 1990); Commonwealth v. Cast, 556
N.E.2d 69, 76 (Mass. 1990); People v. Carr, 121 N.W.2d 449, 451 (Mich. 1963); Rooks v.
State, 529 So. 2d 546, 551 (Miss. 1988); State v. Allen, 844 P.2d 105, 108 (Mont. 1992);
State v. Vermeule, 453 N.W.2d 441, 442 (Neb. 1990); State v. Sterndale, 656 A.2d 409, 41112 (N.H. 1995); State v. Young, 432 A.2d 874, 879 (N.J. 1981); People v. Belton, 432 N.E.2d
745, 74546 (N.Y. 1982); State v. Isleib, 356 S.E.2d 573, 577 (N.C. 1987); State v.
Kottenbroch, 319 N.W.2d 465, 469 (N.D. 1982); State v. Kessler, 373 N.E.2d 1252, 1255-56
(Ohio 1978); State v. Ratcliff, 642 N.E.2d 31, 34-35 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Hall v. State, 766
P.2d 1002, 1005 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); State v. Kock, 725 P.2d 1285, 1287 (Or. 1986);
State v. Brown, 721 P.2d 1357, 1360-62 (Or. 1986); Commonwealth v. Rosenfelt, 662 A.2d
1131, 1145 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); State v. Werner, 615 A.2d 1010, 1014 (R.I. 1992); State v.
McTier, 215 S.E.2d 908,912 (S.C. 1975); State v. Nolsch, 273 N.W.2d 732, 736 (S.D. 1978);
Osban v. State, 726 S.W.2d 107, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc); State v. Larocco,
794 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah 1990); State v. Savva, 616 A.2d 774, 779-81 (Vt. 1992); State v.
Patterson, 774 P.2d 10, 12 (Wash. 1989) (en banc);Jordan v. Holland, 324 S.E.2d 372, 378
(W. Va. 1984); State v. Tompkins, 423 N.W.2d 823, 832 (Wis. 1988); Hunter v. State, 704
P.2d 713, 715 (Wyo. 1985).
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Table 1 above shows the growing effectiveness of state law as a sufficient protector of individual rights, and the rights-sensitivity of the
state courts that have established these rights. Again, it must be
pointed out that there is no federal constitutional mandate for replicating these rights in state law; neither the Constitution nor the
Supreme Court require it. And yet 72% of the state constitutions have
been construed as regulating such matters as investigative stops and
brief detentions of the person. 70% limit vehicle searches pursuant to
the so-called automobile exception doctrine. No fewer than one-third
of the states have established state constitutional protections equal to
or exceeding each of the remaining Fourth Amendment doctrines analyzed. Furthermore, state constitutionalism is a widespread phenomenon, not one limited to a mere handful of states. Every state except
three-Alabama, Georgia, and Virginia-is represented in the above
table, i.e., 47 of the 50 states have established or enlarged federal
search and seizure rights on state constitutional grounds."13
How can it still be argued that the state courts are backwaters
unreceptive to defendants' rights and in need of federal suzerainty? A
good chunk of Fourth Amendment doctrine, or some more protective
variant of it, is now a part of the state constitutional jurisprudence of
most states. Moreover, the states have also rendered hundreds of state
constitutional decisions on issues that implicate Fifth and Sixth
Amendment and general due process rights." 4 Although there are
more search and seizure cases than any others in the body of state
constitutional criminal law, it is not likely that the states are more receptive to search and seizure rights with their costly exclusionary remedies than to other defendants' rights." 5 Therefore, a table of other
criminal procedure issues would probably demonstrate that state constitutional law is fully developed in these areas as well.
The development of state constitutional law is not some transient
phenomenon; it is a fixture on the American legal landscape and will
be for the foreseeable future. Whatever the motivation for its creation-an assertion of independence by the state judiciary, promotion
113 Only two states, Maryland and South Carolina, are listed just once; 45 states appear
two or more times. It is interesting that Southern states are overrepresented among the
jurisdictions that are inactive in developing state constitutional law. This probably reflects
their conservatism. It should also be noted, however, that Texas and West Virginia, unlike
their southern neighbors, are listed in the table numerous times (ten and seven,
respectively).
114 See LATZER, supra note 1, at §§ 4-8 for collection and analysis of these cases.

115 There are more search and seizure cases undoubtedly because there are more
searches and seizures than other events of constitutional significance (most of which occur
in the context of a trial or some other courtroom proceeding) in the criminal justice
process.
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of a rights-expansive agenda, development of traditional state legal institutions, a desire to improve upon Supreme Court doctrines, or all
of the above-state constitutionalism exists independent of the federal caselaw. It provides its own basis for defendants' rights, a basis
created and controlled by the state courts. The very existence of this
body of law is compelling proof that the state bench-on its own and
without Supreme Court dictate-is sensitive to the rights of the
accused.
But if more evidence were needed, the fact that state courts have
established broader-than-federal rights is surely conclusive. Here we
have an instance where the state bench is literally repudiating the
Supreme Court in order to expand rights. What more need be said
about the state courts' commitment to individual rights? So much has
been written about this phenomenon that it need only be treated
briefly here. Table 2 below presents the same search and seizure rights
set forth in Table 1, except that the right-hand column lists only states
that have established broaderrights.
TABLE 2
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON SELECTED LAW

ENFORCEMENT AcTrVIES THAT ARE BROADER THAN FOURTH
AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS

Activity Subject to FourthAmendment
Limitations
1. Home entries
to effect felony
16

Number of States with Broader State
ConstitutionalLimitations
Zero (0% of states)

arrests

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Seizures
of items in "plain
117
view
Searches pursuant to consentn 9
2
"Seizures" of the person '
"Stops" and brief detentions of
the person'23
"Stops" of vehicles (nonroadblock) "z
Protective (weapons)
searches of
12 6
the person
Vehicle impoundment
and
28
inventory1
Searches of persons incident to
arrest 30
Vehicle2 searches incident to

Seven" 8 (14% of states)
Two 120 (4% of states)
Four 122 (8% of states)
Three2 (6% of states)
Zero (0% of states)
One 127 (2% of states)
Nine"s (18% of states)
Seven'
Nine

3

(14% of states)
(18% of states)

arrest13

11.

Vehicle searches pursuant
to the
"automobile exception" 3 4

Eleven'

(22% of states)

94
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116 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
17

1 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987);

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
8
" See Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 734 (Alaska 1979); State v. Stachler, 570 P.2d 1323
(Haw. 1977); State v. Murray, 598 A.2d 206, 208 (N.H. 1991); State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347,
350-52 (N.H. 1983); State v. Bruzzese, 463 A.2d 320, 323-24 (N.J. 1983); Heitman v. State,
815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); State v. Austin, 584 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah
1978); State v. Bell, 737 P.2d 254, 256-57 (Wash. 1987).
Note that most of the above cases predate Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990),
which cut back on federal rights against plain view seizures. Many state courts have not
had the opportunity to rule on the plain view issue post-Horton.
119 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
120See State v. Kearns, 867 P.2d 903 (Haw. 1994) (dicta); State v.Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 6768 (N.J. 1975).
121 See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567
(1988); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (plurality opinion).
'22 See State v. Kearns, 867 P.2d 903, 908-09 (Haw. 1994); State v. Quino, 840 P.2d 358, 363
(Haw. 1992); State v. Tucker, 626 So. 2d 707, 711-12 (La. 1993); In reE.D.J., 502 N.W.2d
779, 781 (Minn. 1993); State v. Tucker, 642 A.2d 401, 405 (N.J. 1994).
in See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
24
1 See Commonwealth v. Lyons, 564 N.E.2d 390, 391-92 (Mass. 1990); State v. Kennison,
590 A.2d 1099, 1101 (N.H. 1991); State v. Pully, 863 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Tenn. 1993).
'25 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
26
1 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979);
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
127 See People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 301 (N.Y. 1993) (rejecting "plain touch"
exception to
the
warrant requirement).
8
12 See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
12 See State v. Daniel, 589 P.2d 408, 416 (Alaska 1979); Wagner v. Commonwealth, 581
S.W.2d 352, 356 (Ky. 1979), rev'd in part, Estep v. Commonwealth, 663 S.W.2d 213 (Ky.
1983); State v. Sims, 426 So. 2d 148, 153 (La. 1983); State v. Sawyer, 571 P.2d 1131, 1133
(Mont. 1977); State v. Mangold, 414 A.2d 1312, 1316 (NJ. 1980); State v. Lunsford, 655
S.W.2d 921, 924 (Tenn. 1983); Drinkard v. State, 584 S.W.2d 650, 652-53 (Tenn. 1979);
Autran v. State, 887 S.W.2d 31, 37-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (plurality opinion); State v.
Williams, 689 P.2d 1065 (Wash. 1984); State v. Perry, 324 S.E.2d 354, 357-58 (W. Va. 1984);
State v. Goff, 272 S.E.2d 457, 460 (W. Va. 1980).
130 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
' See Zehrung v. State, 569 P.2d 189, 199 (Alaska 1977); State v. Dukes, 547 A.2d 10, 18
(Conn. 1988); State v. Barrett, 701 P.2d 1277, 1281 (Haw. 1985); Commonwealth v.
Madera, 521 N.E.2d 738, 740-41 (Mass. 1988); People v. Gokey, 457 N.E.2d 723 (N.Y.
1983); State v. Caraher, 653 P.2d 942, 948 (Or. 1982); State v. Ringer, 674 P.2d 1240, 124247 (Wash. 1983).
112 See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
1' See State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982); State v. Stemdale, 656 A-2d
409, 411-12 (N.H. 1995); State v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947, 959-60 (NJ. 1994); People v.
Blasich, 541 N.E.2d 40 (N.Y. 1989) (dicta); People v. Gokey, 457 N.E.2d 723 (N.Y. 1983);
State v. Brown, 588 N.E.2d 113, 115 (Ohio 1992); State v. Kirsch, 686 P.2d 446 (Or. 1984);
State v. Stroud, 720 P.2d 436, 440 (Wash. 1986).
114 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
3
" See State v. Miller, 630 A.2d 1315 (Conn. 1993); State v. Dukes, 547 A.2d 10 (Conn.
1988); State v. Ritte, 710 P.2d 1197 (Haw. 1985); Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77 (Ind.
1995); State v. Greenwald, 858 P.2d 36 (Nev. 1993); State v. Sterndale, 656 A.2d 409 (N.H.
1995); State v. Young, 432 A.2d 874 (N.J. 1981); People v. Belton, 432 N.E.2d 745 (N.Y.
1982); State v. Kock, 725 P.2d 1285 (Or. 1986); State v. Brown, 721 P.2d 1357 (Or. 1986)
(in banc); Commonwealth v. Rosenfelt, 662 A.2d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); State v.
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990); State v. Savva, 616 A.2d 774 (Vt. 1992); State v.
Patterson, 774 P.2d 10 (Wash. 1989) (en banc).
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Although the number of states rejecting Supreme Court doctrines on state grounds is far lower than the number adopting them
(compare Table 1), the repudiations are nonetheless an impressive
measure of state court devotion to individual rights. For instance,
roughly one-fifth of the states have established more protection
against motor vehicle searches than is afforded by the United States
Constitution. Nor are the rejections limited to a few "ultraliberal"
state courts; nearly half of the states are represented in Table 2.136
Furthermore, dozens of other cases provide broader state rights in
search and seizure as well as all of the other areas of criminal
137
procedure.
Whatever the theoretical limitations of state courts as protectors
of individual rights, the reality is that they have matched and exceeded the United States Supreme Court. This sharply undercuts the
claim that the protection of defendants' rights requires the broadest
possible conception of due process. To the contrary, state constitutional law suggests the need to cut back on due process except to
maintain truly fundamental rights. In Part IV of this article, I will suggest a formula by which federal procedures can be disincorporated
without threatening the most basic protections of the Bill of Rights.
IV. A

STANDARD FOR DISINCORPORATION

After the incorporation decisions of the 1960s, the Supreme
Court, in its post-incorporation cases, simply assumed that all of its
rulings construing the incorporated provisions Bill of Rights applied
to the states. To assume, however, that every Bill of Rights decision is
also a due process decision is error. Justice Goldberg's contention
that the states must be given no latitude lest they abridge fundamental
rights' 3 8 -i.e., that due process must impose on the states the exact
same rules that the Bill of Rights demands of the federal government-makes sense only if the procedure subjudice is itself essential to
the maintenance of some incorporated right. Only then would the
failure to adopt that procedure pose a threat to one of the "fundamental liberties protected by the Constitution." But if the contrary is
true-if the challenged procedure is not essential to the administration of a fundamental right-then the procedure should not be imposed on the states. To impose it anyway is to undermine the Tenth
136 Some state courts are apparently more liberal (i.e., rights-protective), as is indicated
by multiple appearances in Table 2. Hawaii and NewJersey top the list of states rejecting
Supreme Court doctrines; each did so six times. Washington is next with five rejections.
137 See LATZER, supra note 1, passim for collection and analysis of cases.
138 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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Amendment. 13 9 There is no requirement in the Constitution that the
states adopt a procedure because the Supreme Court thinks that it is
useful, beneficial or helpful in enforcing a right. "Federal courts hold
no supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension." 14 Surely,
where a basic postulate of federalism is implicated-that the states
may decide for themeselves the best way to conduct their business,
including that paradigm of state "business," the administration of state
criminal law-a much higher standard should be met. It should have
to be demonstrated, not merely assumed, that the procedure is vital to
the preservation of a due process right. To contend that a procedure
is essential to a Bill of Rights provision-so essential that it trumps
Tenth Amendment considerations-the Court should have to show,
not just that it is useful, beneficial or helpful, but that it is the most
efficacious way of supporting the right, or better still, that the right
could not survive in its present form without the rule in question.
Each post-incorporation case should have asked whether the challenged rule was essential to the administration of a fundamental right.
Having failed to ask this essentiality question, the Court proceded to
incorporate rules reflexively, undoubtedly including procedures that
are not vital to the preservation of a fundamental right. Unreflective
incorporation has produced a rather sizable body of law, and in the
area of criminal procedure, a virtual constitutional code for the states.
Perhaps it is too late to reopen so many cases; stare decisis surely
14
frowns upon such a massive second look. '
There are, however, some post-incorporation cases that are especially troublesome and virtually cry out for re-examination. Mirandav.
Arizona'4 2 and Mapp v. Ohio' 43 are the most obvious examples. In the
139 The Tenth Amendment, in constitutional disrepute for decades, is making something of a comeback. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (federal criminal
law prohibiting the possession of firearms on school grounds exceeded congressional authority under the Commerce Clause); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
(federal law requiring the states to take title to radioactive waste and be liable for all damages incurred by its delayed disposal exceeded the limits of congressional power or, alternatively, violated the Tenth Amendment); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)
(federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act does not apply to state courtjudges). This
article treats the Tenth Amendment as a shorthand for federalism, which diffuses governmental power by assigning certain authority to the states. U.S. CONST. amend. X: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people."
140 Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982) (reversing grant of federal habeas corpus
where prosecutorial conduct did not amount to a constitutional violation). See supranote
79.
141 See supra note 18.
142 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
143 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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offspring of these cases, the Court announced that the Mirandaand
Mapp rules are not mandated by the Constitution at all, that they are a
mere judicial creation, a prophylaxis for administrative convenience.
Unreflectively incorporating such rules is particularly difficult to justify because the constitutional warrant for the rule is lacking. The theory of incorporation was that fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights
were part of due process. Giving the broadest possible scope to the
Supreme Court's authority to interpret these rights, we may add to
due process many subsidiary rules that may be considered essential to
the preservation of a fundamental right. But surely this demands reconsideration of those rules that are, by the Court's own admission,
no part of any constitutional right. Even if it is too late to question all
of the numerous post-incorporation decisions, surely it remains feasible to re-examine those decisions that have been expressly uprooted
from their constitutional foundations.
Over twenty years ago, Henry P. Monaghan recognized the problem of what may be called quasiconstitutional rules, and concluded
that they were within the Court's authority to develop "a constitutional common law subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress." 44 Even assuming Monaghan's answer is
satisfactory insofar as the Court's authority to develop civil liberties
doctrine is concerned, the Fourteenth Amendment problem remains
unresolved, as he apparently recognized.
One might adopt the view ofJustice Powell that all the bag and baggage
of the Bill of Rights does not apply to the states, by arguing that the
common law components of the right do not necessarily carry over.
Whether they do or not is a separate issue in which the value of the
particular common law rule must be assessed in light of possibly countervailing federalism considerations. 145
144 Monaghan, Forwar& ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3 (1975). Re-

garding the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule Monaghan wrote:
While the Mapp majority may have held the exclusionary rule to be an indispensable
remedial aspect of the fourth amendment, the Court's decisions in the last two Terms
have cut the exclusionary rule entirely free from any personal right or necessary remedy approach, thereby removing the clearest authority for imposing the rule on the
states.
As a matter of traditional constitutional theory, the significant issue is whether the
Supreme Court has the authority to mandate the exclusionary rule if the rule is not a
necessary corollary of a constitutional right.
Id. at 4, 6 (footnote omitted). His concern with the Mirandarule was similar.
That the Mirandaprophylactic rule approach is "better" than the burdensome task of
normal case-by-case adjudication may be conceded. The question is whether the Court
has the authority to require such rules of the state courts where it is unwilling to treat
the prophylactic implementing rule as a necessary dimension of an underlying constitutional right.
Id at 22 (footnote omitted).
145 Id at 40 (footnote omitted).

BARRY LATZER

[Vol. 87

In the decades since Monaghan wrote, the bag-and-baggage controversy died, the post-incorporation decisions multiplied, and Miranda and the exclusionary rule survived in their neither-fish-nor-fowl
constitutional status. Just as significantly, the states moved apace toward the development of their own constitutional criminal procedure
codes, highlighting the existence of "countervailing federalism considerations." Despite the availability of this state law alternative, and the
crumbling federal constitutional foundation for Miranda and Mapp,
no one seems to question the status of the post-incorporation
1 46
decisions.
It is not too late. Without reopening the selective incorporation
debate, without stripping due process of its fundamental rights content, the Court can, and should, selectively reconsider its post-incorporation decisions. What is needed is a formula that maintains as a
part of due process the fundamental rights of the Bill of Rights, yet
permits the states to develop their own implementation rules. The
standard suggested below would leave intact the fundamental rights
test for incorporation of truly basic rights. It would not, however, pretend that every rule that facilitates the administration of a basic right
is also "fundamental." Nor would it abandon every rule that is not.
Unlike the bag and baggage challengers, we would ask not whether
the challenged rule is itself fundamental, but whether it is essential to
the survival of a fundamental right.
Where the Supreme Court finds that a challenged procedure is
not absolutely essential to maintaining a fundamental right it should
disincorporate the procedure, i.e., remove it from the Due Process
Clause. If, for instance, Mirandais challenged, the Court should engage in a disincorporation inquiry, asking whether the Mirandarule is
essential to the preservation of the Fifth Amendment right against
compulsory self-incrimination. 147 If the answer is in the negative, Mirandashould be reversed. Would such a reversal reignite the selective
146

But cf Donald A. Dripps, Foreword:Against PoliceInterrogation-Andthe PrivilegeAgainst

Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699 (1988) (arguing that the Supreme

Court should disincorporate the entire self-incrimination privilege).
147 The possibility of a full-scale challenge may not be as remote as one might think. It
has been suggested that the federal statute purporting to override Miranda, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501, could serve as a vehicle for such litigation. Paul G. Cassell & Joseph Grano, A
Federal Statute that Overrules Miranda: A New Argument for Federal Prosecutors in Confession
Cases, 2 CiurM. PRAc. L. REP. 145 (1994) (urging federal prosecutors to rely on § 3501 when
seeking to admit a confession challenged on Mirandagrounds). However, as such a suit
would implicate only federal law, it is probably a better vehicle for establishing that Miranda is not required by the Fifth Amendment than for establishing that it should be removed from the Fourteenth. A state version of § 3501, such as exists in Arizona, would be
a better basis for a disincorporation challenge. ARiz. Rxv. STAT. ANN.§ 13-3988 (West 1978
and Supp. 1995).
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incorporation controversy and jeopardize the decision which first es14 8
tablished that the Fifth Amendment right was a part of due process?
This is not likely, because the Miranda-disincorporating ruling need
not ask whether the self-incrimination clause is fundamental; it need
only ask whether Miranda is essential to the preservation of that
clause.
Let us make clear what is not required by disincorporation analysis. First, asjust noted, there is no need to question the incorporation
of the broad general principles of the Bill of Rights itself. This analysis does not mean that we should return to the days when the Fourth
Amendment, or the right against compulsory self-incrimination, or
any of the other basic postulates of the Bill of Rights were considered
limits on the federal government alone. Second, in reconsidering the
subsidiary procedures endorsed in the post-incorporation cases, there
is no need to demonstrate that the challenged procedure is itself a
fundamental right in the sense of "vital to the present-day criminal
justice system." This would be an unfairly difficult standard. A subsidiary procedure is not likely to have the systemic significance of the
basic general rights of the Bill of Rights. If the term "fundamental" is
used in disincorporation analysis, it should be used in a different
sense; it should be understood to mean "essential to the administration of a fundamental right."
Let us now consider what disincorporation analysis might look
like. If a hitherto incorporated procedure is challenged, the Court
should first examine the relationship of the procedure in question to
the basic right it is supposed to protect. This requires analysis of the
meaning and purpose of the basic right. It also demands an empirical
and normative assessment of the challenged procedure. Empirically,
the question is: does the procedure actually promote the end sought?
If the answer is "no," there is no point in continuing; why impose a
procedure that does not serve its intended function? If the answer is
"yes," a judgment must be made that the benefit in promoting the
right outweighs the harm to Tenth Amendment values caused by forcing the states to adopt a uniform procedure. To answer this, the
Court should ask whether the right could survive in its present form
without the procedure in question. Alternatively, or additionally, it
should determine whether the procedure is the most efficacious way
of supporting the right, or if there are effective alternative enforcement mechanisms available which the states, left to their own devices,
148 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 15-17, 26 (1964). For an argument that Maloy erred
and that the self-incrimination clause should not have been incorporated see Dripps, supra
note 146, at 728-29.
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might develop. Relevant here is evidence that the states have developed protection for the right on the basis of independent state law.
If the Court were to signal that it is ready to disincorporate, new
kinds of cases would surely seek a place on its dockets. Sensing that
they might be freed from the due process yoke, states would begin to
develop alternative enforcement mechanisms for criminal procedure
rights. These would be challenged by defendants; ultimately, and appropriately, they would be subject to Supreme Court review. A slightly
varied disincorporation analysis is appropriate in such cases. The initial question is the same: does the procedure actually promote the
basic right it is supposed to protect? If so, in light of the need to
protect the basic right as well as Tenth Amendment values, is the procedure sufficiently effective to obviate the need for a uniform national
rule? An affirmative answer requires approval of the procedure.
Only this kind of analysis or something like it will give proper
consideration and respect to the function of the states in the federal
system. This is not a call for a watering down of the Bill of Rights. To
the contrary, it is a reaffirmation that those rights must be nationally
honored. It is a demand that the Tenth Amendment-also a pillar of
the Bill of Rights-be honored too, by allowing the states more flexibility in administering those rights.
Nor would disincorporation radically restructure the role of the
Supreme Court. The Court, will retain its authority to broadly construe constitutional provisions, although it will have to think twice
before applying every procedure to the states. Furthermore, it will
remain the ultimate arbiter of the suitability of state procedures as
guarantors of individual rights. Under the regime of disincorporation, the Supreme Court will stand ready to step in should a state fail
in its obligations to develop a suitable apparatus to protect fundamental rights. It can use any number of potent remedies, from relief in a
single case to sweeping injunctive relief aimed at an entire state. 14 9
However, due process should be considered satisfied where a state can
demonstrate that it has a bona fide workable mechanism for enforcing federal rights. This will insure that the states meet their obligations to give force to the Bill of Rights without compelling them to
adopt inflexible uniform procedures.
149 1 am aware that federal injunctive relief for alleged state official misconduct is disfavored, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983) (barring injunction against
chokeholds by police), but it remains available where other remedies are ineffective. Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 202-03 (4th Cir. 1966) (upholding injunction against home
searches by police). Why not for a state failure to develop policies to protect basic federal
constitutional rights? From the standpoint of federalism it is far better for the Court to
come down hard on a few states than to confine them all in a constitutional straitjacket.
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As indicated earlier, there are two procedures that cry out for
disincorporation analysis: the Miranda rule and the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court has expressly said that
neither are constitutional rights, virtually inviting questions about
their legitimacy. Both have been the subject of intense attack by police, the Justice Department, various scholars and practitioners. 150
They have likewise been the subjects of intense scrutiny in the state
courts. 15 1 Mirandaobviously, and Mapp colorably, are products of the

post-incorporation era. 15 2 Are the Miranda rule and the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule essential to the maintenance of fundamental constitutional rights? If not, they should be disincorporated.
We first apply disincorporation analysis to Miranda.
A.

DISINCORPORATING MIfRANDA

From the 1930s, when the notorious Brown v. Mississii'5 3 case
arose, to the 1960s, when Miranda v. Arizona 5 4 radically changed the
law, confessions in state courts had to meet the test of "voluntariness"
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. The
privilege against self-incrimination applied to proceedings (such as trials) in which the individual was subject to legal compulsion to testify,
not to police interrogation. 55 In 1964, in the face of decades of precedent to the contrary, Malloy v. Hogan 5 6 established that the Fifth
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause applied to the states, because
150 Regarding Miranda,see the critique presented in and the numerous authorities cited
byJoSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH AND THE LAv passim (1993). For attacks on the
exclusionary rule see, e.g., STEVEN R. SCHLESINGER, ExCLusIONARY INjUSTICE (1977); Akhil
Reed Amar, FourthAmendment FirstPrinciples,107 HARv.L. REv. 757 (1994); John Kaplan,
The Limits of the Exclusionay Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027 (1974); Malcolm Richard Wilkey, A
Call for Alternatives to the Exclusionay Ride, 62 JUDICATURE 351 (1979); Malcolm Richard
Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 214 (1978).

151 LATZER, supra note 1, at ch. 2 (analyzing state constitutional cases involving exclusionary rules).
152 Miranda is a typical post-incorporation ruling in that the self-incrimination clause
upon which it purported to rest had already been incorporated, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1 (1964); there was no significant Tenth Amendment analysis; and the Court assumed that
its rule was applicable to the states. Mapp is less obviously a post-incorporation case because the Mapp Court did not take the incorporation issue for granted. However, the core
of the Fourth Amendment right had already been applied to the states in Wolfv. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949), and reconsideration of Mapp would notjeopardize Wolf
153 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (beating and hanging a suspect to obtain a
confession violates due process).
154 Miranda, 384 U.S. 436.
155 "Why had the privilege against self-incrimination been excluded from the stationhouse all these years? The legal reasoning was that compulsion to testify meant legal
compulsion." YALE KAmisAR ET AL., MODERN CiMrNAL PROCEDURE 471 (8th ed. 1994).
156 Malloy, 378 U.S. at 1 (wimess in state gambling inquiry had Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to refuse to answer questions).
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"the accusatorial system has become a fundamental part of the fabric
of our society."'1 57 Malloy also declared that the states were bound by

the same self-incrimination standard as the federal government, and
that this standard applied to confessions, not just to trials. Legal
scholars-even Miranda's best friends-agree that the application of
the Fifth Amendment to police interrogations was virtually unprecedented in the provision's history.'5 8
Two years after Malloy, Mirandav. Arizona 59 was decided. There
it was held that a confession obtained by state police from a suspect in
custody was inadmissible even though there was no evidence of coercion, unless the prosecution proved that the police informed the suspect of his right to silence and to counsel, and that the suspect
voluntarily waived these rights. "Failure to administer Mirandawarnings creates a presumption of compulsion. Consequently, unwarned
statements that are otherwise voluntary within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be excluded from evidence
" 160
under Miranda.
A strong argument has been made that Miranda v. Arizona is an
illegitimate decision and should therefore be reversed because its rule
is not required by the Fifth Amendment. 16 1 The Supreme Court itself
has acknowledged that the Miranda rule is not a Fifth Amendment
mandate, while continuing to enforce it, apparently on the assumption that the Court has the authority to enforce prophylactic rules that
help prevent Fifth Amendment violations. 162 This article questions
that assumption insofar as enforcement against the states is concerned. Whether or not the Court has Article III authority to enforce
broad quasiconstitutional rules is a question separate from the meaning of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process.' 65 No matter how broad
Id. at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
"Whether or not this approach to police interrogation and confessions makes good
sense it constitutes very questionable history-at least since Brown v. Mississippi (1936) ....
In none of the dozens of federal or state confession cases decided by the Court in the
1930's, 1940's and 1950's had the privilege against self-incrimination, certainly not as it
applied to judicial proceedings, been the basis forjudgment (although it had occasionally
been mentioned in an opinion)." KAMISAR ET Ai.., supra note 155, at 470.
157
158

159 Miranda,384 U.S. 436.

Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985).
For a sustained assault on Miranda drawing that very conclusion, see GRANO, supra
note 150, passim. For a similar view see OFFICE OF LEGAL PoLIcY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
TRUTH IN CRIMrNALJUSTICE SERIES, REPORT No. 1, THE LAW OF PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATION, 1,
42 (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 437 (1989).
162 E.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) ("The prophylactic Miranda
warnings therefore are 'not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.' " (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974))).
163 See supranotes 144-45 and accompanying text. Grano seems to argue that all prophy160
161
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the Court's interpretational authority, there is no warrant for imposing upon the states rules that are not demanded by due process. The
issue considered here is whether or not the Mirandarule is properly a
part of due process.
This requires disincorporation analysis, which begins with an examination of the meaning and purpose of the basic right, in this case,
the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause. The analysis continues with an empirical and normative assessment of the Mirandarule:
does it in fact promote Fifth Amendment ends, and if so, does that
benefit outweigh the harm to Tenth Amendment values caused by
forcing the states to adopt a uniform procedure? In balancing the
Fifth Amendment benefit against the Tenth Amendment harm we ask
whether the self-incrimination right could survive in its present form
without a national Mirandarule. In addition, we inquire whether Miranda offers the most efficacious way of supporting the right, and
whether effective alternative enforcement mechanisms are available.
We also look at evidence that the states have developed protection
against compulsory self-incrimination on the basis of independent
state law.
The Fifth Amendment says, "nor shall [any person] be compelled
in any Criminal Case to be a witness against himself."' 64 Although this
provision, prior to the 1960s, protected against legal compulsion to
give evidence against oneself at trial, Miranda applied it to police interrogations. It did so out of a belief that compulsion is "inherent" in
incommunicado interrogation, or at least potentially SO. 16 5 The Milactic rules, like the one created by Miranda,are illegitimate exercises of Supreme Court's
Article m authority. (U.S. CONSr. art. MI§§ 1, 2 says in part: "The judicial Power of the
United States shall be vested in one supreme Court.... The judicial Powei shall extend to
all cases... arising under this Constitution.") He defines prophylactic rules as those which
"may be violated without violating the Constitution." G.ANo,supra note 150, at 175. This
has drawn the criticism that constitutional law is filled with such rules, in, e.g., First Amendment and equal protection jurisprudence, and that Grano's position threatens whole bodies of constitutional law as wellas the Court's authority to make such law. David A. Strauss,
The Ubiquity of ProphylacicRules, 55 U. CHi. L. Rrv. 190 (1988).
Recast as a due process question, the issue is not whether the Court has the authority
to enforce prophylactic rules generally, but whether any given rule is enforceable against
the states as a matter of due process. Thus, the question is whether a prophylactic rule is
essential to the enforcement of a Bill of Rights provision. Although prophylactic rules, by
definition, are not required by the Bill of Rights, and will not usually establish fundamental
rights, it is conceivable that some prophylactic rules might satisfy the essentiality criterion
and therefore merit incorporation into Due Process. Disincorporation thus sidesteps the
question of the Court's general authority to establish prophylactic rules as a matter of
constitutional interpretation. Assuming such authority, disincorporation provides a
formula for determining the applicability of prophylactic rules to the states.
164 U.S. CONST. amend. V.

165 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58. "An individual swept from familiar surroundings into
police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of per-

104
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randa Court described the general purpose of the self-incrimination
privilege in these terms:
We have recently noted that the privilege against self-incrimination-the
essential mainstay of our adversary system-is founded on a complex of
values ....All these policies point to one overriding thought: the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government-state or federal-must accord to the dignity and integrity of its
citizens. To maintain a "fair state-individual balance," to require the government "to shoulder the entire load," to respect the inviolability of the
human personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice demands
that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the
cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth. In sum,
the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right "to
remain silent
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his
16 6
own will."
The main concern of the provision is to protect both individual
autonomy and the adversary system by preventing government from
using improper means to obtain from the accused incriminating statements to be offered as evidence against him at his trial. It should be
noted that there is considerable disagreement as to what constitutes
"improper means" in the interrogation context sufficient to implicate
the Fifth Amendment. Whereas all agree that the conditions that
make a confession "involuntary" (e.g., violence or threats of violence,
humiliation, protracted questioning, etc.) clearly violate the Fifth
Amendment, some would go way beyond (or below) the involuntariness standard and hold that all custodial questioning by the police is
compulsion. 1 67 As noted above, 168 the MirandaCourt itself was ambivalent on the matter, suggesting sometimes that police questioning is
inherently compelling, and other times that it is only potentially so.
However, the post-MirandaCourt has resolved the issue by casting the
Miranda rule as establishing no more than a presumption of compulsion, thus rejecting the inherent compulsion view. "Failure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion.
suasion described above cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak." Id.at 461.
However, the Mirandaopinion also said that the confessions actually obtained might not
have been "involuntary in traditional terms," but they created a "potentiality for compulsion." Id,at 457.
166 Id. at 460 (citations omitted).
167 Compare Steven J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. Ray. 435, 446
(1987) ("Custodial interrogation brings psychological pressure to bear for the purpose of
overcoming the suspect's unwillingness to talk, and it is therefore inherently compelling
within the meaning of the fifth amendment.") with GRANt, supranote 150, at 135 ("But to
repeat, unless the Fifth Amendment is read as a prohibition on all police questioning,
custodial and noncustodial, it can be read in the context of police interrogation only as
providing protection against involuntariness or coercion.").
168 See supra note 165.
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Consequently, unwarned statements that are otherwise voluntary
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be excluded from evidence under Miranda."169 Clearly, custodial interrogation cannot be both inherently compelling and voluntary within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Therefore, it may be concluded
that the main point of the Fifth Amendment, as interpreted since the
1960s, is that self-incrimination induced by improper police tactics
(and not mere custodial interrogation) does not comport with the
dignity and integrity of the individual which the amendment protects.
Is there empirical proof that the Miranda requirements do indeed protect the individual against self-incrimination induced by improper police tactics? The empirical studies concerning Miranda
focus on its effects on police, and only incidentally on the consequences for the Fifth Amendment rights of suspects. 170 Most of these
studies conclude that the impact of Mirandaon law enforcement itself
has been minimal in that the number of confessions admitted and
convictions obtained did not diminish. 17 1 Less is known regarding Miranda's impact on defendants' rights. The studies showing minimal
impact on law enforcement can be read to suggest that police are obtaining statements despite compliance with Miranda,but they also can
be interpreted to mean that Mirandais ineffective at preventing improperly pressured waivers. The latter explanation supports the conclusion that Miranda has not protected defendants' rights. By the
same token, if, as a revisionist interpretation of the Miranda studies
suggests, 172 Mirandahas discouraged confessions, that can also mean
either that Miranda has reduced (or helped reduce) abusive police
practices that improperly induce confessions, or, that Mirandahas created a climate in which suspects are dissuaded from confessing even
in the absence of abusive police misconduct.
Certainly one has the impression that there are far fewer police
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985).
170 See the studies cited in KamisLA ET AL., supra note 155, at 599, and summarized in
LWA BAKER, MIRA-NDA: CRuME, LAw AND PoItrics 180-81, 403-05 (1983). For an exhaustive
recent reevaluation of the Miranda studies see Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An
Empirical Reassessmen4 90 Nw. U.L. REv. 387 (1996).
171 Practitioner surveys plus earlier empirical studies were said to serve as a "strong repudiation of the claim that law enforcement would be greatly improved if Mirandawere re169

pealed or overruled." SPECiAL Comm.ON CRiMInALJUSTICE IN A FRE Soc'y, Am.BAR ASS'N,
CRIMINAL USTICE IN CRisIs 28 (1988). For a contrary view of Mirandds impact on law en-

forcement see Cassell, supra note 170 at 417 (concluding that the empirical studies of
Mirandashow that police failed to obtain confessions in one out of every six cases (16%)
due to Miranda, resulting in lost cases against 3.8% of all questioned suspects). Cassell's
conclusions are challenged in Steven J. Schulhofer, Miranda's PracticalEffect: Substantial
Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U.L. Rav. 500 (1996).
172 Cassell, supra note 170.
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abuses since the 1960s, 173 but how much of this (assuming it is true) is
due to Miranda, and how much to improved police training, intensified media scrutiny of police, and a general societal increase in respect for individual rights that is shared by police officers, is difficult
to say. The commentators are divided on the credit due Mirandaas
opposed to other factors. 174 Of course, it is possible that Miranda,and
even the public debate surrounding Miranda,may have indirectly protected defendants by contributing to the changes in police training,
media scrutiny, and respect for individual rights, but this effect is speculative and too indirect to credit here.
Although the empirical evidence is inconclusive as to which effect
predominates, it seems fair to conclude that Mirandahas, in different
cases, underprotected, protected and overprotected defendants. It
has underprotected by providing no way to detect or remedy police
abuses other than the failure to comply with Miranda's strictures. Miranda provides an exclusionary sanction for a violation of Miranda's
rules, but Miranda can do nothing to prevent police from abusing a
suspect and lying about it. Indeed, police could lie about the administration of Mirandarights as well.' 75 In some cases of course, Miranda
has done what it was intended to do by alerting suspects directly about
their rights, and it has probably contributed to the general sensitizing
of police to the rights of suspects. But it has also overprotected defendants by substituting the rigid formalism of compliance with Miranda rules for the real Fifth Amendment question-whether the
suspect was compelled to confess.
No one can deny that Miranda's overprotection has resulted in
the suppression of voluntary statements. To offer just one illustration,
consider the aforementioned Oregon v. Elstad.176 In that case, two police officers went to an eighteen-year-old suspect's home with a warrant for his arrest for burglarizing a neighboring residence. They
were met by defendant's mother who led them to Elstad's bedroom,
where he lay on his bed in his shorts listening to a stereo. The officers
173 There is some weak empirical evidence of a reduction in police abuses: the number
of Supreme Court cases holding that custodial interrogations produced involuntary statements has declined. One analyst found twenty-three such reversals in the quarter century
preceding Miranda, but only two in the same time period after Miranda. Louis Michael
Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 745 (1992).
174 CompareGerald M. Caplan, MirandaRevisited, 93 YALE L.J. 1375, 1382-83 (1984) (Mirandacurbed police excesses) with Cassell, supra note 170, at 473-78 (coerced confessions
declined before Miranda). Cassell's view is supported by GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE

HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS

BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?

(1991).

175 As Justice Harlan observed: "Those who use third-degree tactics and deny them in
court are equally able and destined to lie as skillfully about warnings and waivers." Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 505 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
176 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
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asked him to dress and accompany them to the livingroom. There,
one of the officers testified, he asked Elstad whether he knew why the
police had come. When Elstad said that he had no idea, the officer
then asked if he knew someone named Gross, the burglary victim. Elstad replied that he did and also that he heard there was a robbery at
the Gross house. "And at that point," the officer testified, "I told Mr.
Elstad that I felt he was involved in that, and he looked at me and
77
stated, 'Yes, I was there.'"
Elstad went on to give a warned statement at the police station,
fully admitting his involvement in the crime, and the Supreme Court
held that the second confession was not the tainted fruit of the improper livingroom interrogation. But the important point for our
purposes is that the livingroom statement, while not in compliance
with Miranda (because no warnings were read even though the suspect was in custody and questioned) was not a compelled statement in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. 178 Whereas some in-home interrogation may be compelling, 179 surely the few questions put to young
Elstad were not, unless one takes the view-rejected by the Elstad
Court-that all custodial interrogation compels. Nevertheless, pursuant to Miranda,Elstad's first statement would have to be suppressed.
Even where we cannot say for sure that Mirandaoverprotects by
mandating the suppression of a perfectly voluntary statement it is obvious that it diverts the judiciary from the real Fifth Amendment issue.
One of the most vivid examples of Miranda's excessive formalism is
Californiav. Pysocki'8 0 There, although the Supreme Court ultimately
held the confession admissible, its decision did not even consider the
facts that the juvenile suspect had been warned four times, that the
warnings went beyond Miranda'srequirements, that the suspect's parents were present for both the warnings and the interrogation, and
that the police recorded the interview. Indeed, three Justices would
have suppressed the confession anyway because the fourth Miranda
8
warning was not clear enough!1 '
177 Id. at 301.

178 "It is also beyond dispute that respondent's earlier remark was voluntary, within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Neither the environment nor the manner of either
'interrogation' was coercive." Id. at 315.
179 See, e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (questioning by four officers in defendant's bedroom at 4:00 a.m. created potentiality for compulsion equal to police station
interrogation).
180 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (per curiam) (wherejuvenile was told he has "the right to have a
lawyer appointed to represent you at no cost to yourself," the confession was admissible
because the warnings adequately conveyed to the suspect his rights). Pysock was singled
out, along with other examples of Miranda'sformalism, by GRANo, supra note 150, at 20715.
181 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented on the ground
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Not only can we not say how often Mirandaoverprotects defendants, or diverts the judiciary from true Fifth Amendment questions, we
also cannot say how frequenly it secures Fifth Amendment rights or,
for that matter, fails to protect them at all. Disincorporation analysis
requires that we balance this uncertain or mixed benefit against the
harm to Tenth Amendment values caused by mandating a uniform
national procedure. To the extent that Mirandaoverprotects (and underprotects) it is obviously not essential to the survival of the self-incrimination right. On several occasions, including the previously
discussed Elstadcase, the Supreme Court refused to enforce Miranda's
exclusionary rule, apparently assuming that it was not vital to the protection of Fifth Amendment values. The Court has held that Miranda-as opposed to the self-incrimination right itself-was less
important than protecting against perjury by defendants, 8 2 admitting
third party testimony, 8 3 admitting the fruits of a voluntary confession,1 8 4 or protecting the public safety.18 5 In each of these cases there
was a failure to comply with Miranda,and in each the Court was untroubled because the self-incrimination right was not jeopardized.
New York v. Quarles'8 6 is an especially good illustration of the
Court finding that Miranda's "prophylactic rule" was simply too costly,
thus implying that Miranda could be relaxed without jeopardizing
Fifth Amendment values. In Quarles, the Court refused to suppress
the direct product of unwarned custodial questioning-the suspect's
response-when, reduced to custody in a supermarket, he was asked
the location of his gun. The Court established an exception to Miranda in cases of questioning for the public safety, declaring that "absent actual coercion by the officer, there is no constitutional
imperative requiring exclusion of the evidence that results from police inquiry of this kind."' 8 7 In short, an actual Fifth Amendment violation would still require suppression; a mere Miranda violation does
not. Obviously, the Quarles Court thought that Mirandawas not essential to the maintenance of Fifth Amendment values.
that the warning was ambiguous on its face because it referred to the right to have a lawyer
"appointed," which could have been understood as an offer of trial counsel, not counsel at
interrogation. Prysock, 453 U.S. at 362-66.

182 Harris v. NewYork, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements obtained in violation of Miranda
may be used to impeach the defendant if he testifies).
183 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (admitting the testimony of a witness whose
identity was learned through interrogation in violation of Miranda).
184 Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (admitting defendant's second confession, made shortly
after his initial unwarned but voluntary statement).
185 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (Mirandarule is not applicable to answers
to question in a situation posing a threat to public safety).
186 Id.

187 Id. at 658 n.7.
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These cases indicate that the Supreme Court thinks that the modem self-incrimination right could survive without Miranda. Additional
support for this conclusion is found in the availability of effective alternatives. First, the traditional due process/involuntary confession
test remains in force, as would Supreme Court review of coerced confessions. The Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause would still
be a requisite of Due Process., 8 3 Absent a general reversion by police
departments to brutal methods of yore-highly unlikely in the face of
improved police training, elevated police sensitivity, and media alertness-Supreme Court review of the most egregious cases would probably be sufficient to protect the Fifth Amendment.
But Supreme Court review would not be the only or even the
principal safeguard. The state courts, with their proven vigilance for
defendants' rights, would, in the event of the disiricorporation of Miranda, be the first line of defense, and an extremely effective one. As
proof, consider current state constitutional law. As matters now stand,
the states, to an extent that may be surprising, have replicated Miranda on state constitutional grounds. In a number of instances they
have exceeded Miranda's requirements. None of this is demanded by
due process, not even the state constitutional cloning of Miranda
rights, as the Fourteenth Amendment demands no particular interpretation of state constitutions. 8 9 The state commitment to Miranda-and beyond-is a matter of free choice for the state courts,
and a mark of their devotion to defendants' self-incrimination rights.
Under present day state constitutional law only two states deny
that they have state constitutional Mirandarules, and one of them has,
nevertheless, broadened Mirandarights as a matter of state- common
law. 190 By contrast, six states have expressly declared that the
equivalent of Mirandahas independent significance under their state
constitutional self-incrimination provisions. 19 ' A seventh, Lousiana,
188 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
189 Due Process makes certain rights incumbent

upon the states. The Supremacy Clause
prohibits the states from enforcing less-protective state law where more-protective due process rights (or other federal rights) are available. Less-protective state law may exist; it
simply may not be enforced. See supra notes 2, 9.
190 State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349, 1357-58 (Me. 1981) ("[T]his Court has never decided
that the Maine Constitution requires Miranda warnings to be administered to a person
undergoing custodial interrogation under penalty of exclusion of the evidence if they are
not." Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1368 (Mass. 1992) ("We have not
adopted Miranda or some similar warnings as a means of protecting State constitutional
rights." Commonwealth v. Smith, 593 N.E.2d 1288, 1295 (Mass. 1992) (rejecting, as a matter of common law, the rule of Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)).
191 State v. Jones, 534 A.2d 1199 (Conn. 1987); Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla.
1992); State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657 (Haw. 1971); Abram v. State, 606 So. 2d 1015 (Miss.
1992); State v. Magee, 744 P.2d 250 (Or. 1987) (per curiam); State v. Brunelle, 534 A.2d
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has even adopted a constitutional provision which explicitly provides
for postarrest warnings. 192 Beyond these seven states, there are a great
many states-twenty-two, to date-that have adopted or expanded on
state constitutional grounds various rules established by Mirandaor its
progeny, thus implicitly signaling state constitutional approval of the
Miranda concept. 193 Taken together, twenty-nine states-58%-provide state constitutional protections akin to that established by Miranda. Perhaps ironically, in light of the assaults on the federal rule,
Miranda is alive and well in state law. Were the Supreme Court to
disincorporate Miranda most of the states would have in place the
198 (Vt. 1987).

CONST. art. I, § 13 provides in part:
When any person has been arrested or detained in connection with the investigation
or commission of any offense, he shall be advised fully of the reason for his arrest or
detention, his right to remain silent, his right against self incrimination, his right to
the assistance of counsel and, if indigent, his right to court appointed counsel.
See also In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 589 (La. 1978) (stating that this provision enhanced and
incorporated the prophylactic rules of Miranda).
193 Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Alaska 1985) (state due process requires the
recording of custodial interrogations); State v. Mauro, 766 P.2d 59, 53 (Ariz. 1988) (adopting for the state constitution a definition of interrogation similar to the federal); People v.
Pettingill, 578 P.2d 108, 121 (Cal. 1978) (restricting reinterrogation under the state constitution); State v. Lowe, 616 P.2d 118, 122 (Colo. 1980) (adopting for the state constitution
the federal definition of interrogation); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 93-94 (Del. 1989)
(implying that custodial interrogation requires warnings under the state constitution);
People v. Perry, 590 N.E.2d 454, 455-456 (Ill. 1992) (establishing pursuant to the state
constitution the doctrine of McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991)); Brewer v. State,
646 N.E.2d 1382, 1385 (Ind. 1995) (adopting a higher standard of proof than federal law
demands for waiver of Miranda rights); State v. Mease, 842 S.W.2d 98, 107 (Mo. 1992)
(adopting for the state constitution the rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981));
State v. Johnson, 719 P.2d 1248, 1255 (Mont. 1986) (enlarging on state constitutional
grounds the federal rule for asserting the right to counsel); Holyfield v. State, 711 P.2d
834, 841 (Nev. 1985) (adopting for the state constitution the federal definition of interrogation); State v. Cote, 493 A.2d 1170, 1182 (N.H. 1985) (error to permit police to testify to
defendant's post-Mirandasilence); State v. Martin, 686 P.2d 937, 942 (N.M. 1984) (barring
impeachment by defendant's post-Miranda silence); People v. Cunningham, 400 N.E.2d
360, 361 (N.Y. 1980) (state constitution bars custodial defendant's waiver of right to counsel after previous assertion of right); State v. Hoyle, 382 S.E.2d 752, 754 (N.C. 1989) (barring impeachment by defendant's post-Miranda silence); State v. Roberts, 513 N.E.2d 720,
725 (Ohio 1987) (requiring probation officer to read warnings to in-custody probationer);
Battenfield v. State, 816 P.2d 555, 561-562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (implying that there is
a state constitutional test for interrogation, a prerequisite for warnings); Commonwealth v.
Holcomb, 498 A.2d 833, 841 (Pa. 1985) (adopting for the state constitution the federal
custody standard; custody is a prerequisite for warnings); State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d 265,
269 (Tenn. 1992) (barring reinterrogation pursuant to state constitutional standards);
State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 82-83 (Utah 1993) (rejecting the federal standard for custody);
State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 900-901 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (enlarging the federal rule
respecting the assertion of Miranda rights); State v. Randolph, 370 S.E.2d 741, 743 (W. Va.
1988) (rejecting on state constitutional grounds the rule of Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S.
564 (1987)); State v. Brecht, 421 N.W.2d 96, 103-104 (Wis. 1988) (barring impeachment by
defendant's post-Mirandasilence); Wells v. State, 846 P.2d 589, 594 (Wyo. 1992) (adopting
for the state constitution the two-part test of Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983)).
192 LA.
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equivalent legal guarantees. Perhaps some of these states would follow the Supreme Court's lead and eliminate Miranda. Others would
no doubt retain their state constitutional version as is. And still others
would fill the void with newly minted state Miranda rights. Some
states may develop new approaches, such as a hybrid right, in which
proof that a suspect was informed of his rights is one factor in the
totality of the circumstances indicating that a confession was voluntary. Although no one can say exactly what will happen, current state
constitutional law offers strong reason to trust the state courts to effectively protect against coerced confessions. Should they fail in their
responsibilities, the Supreme Court will still stand ready to review.
The development of state constitutional law is a strong indicator
that the decidedly mixed benefits of the federal Miranda rule are far
outweighed by its damage to the Tenth Amendment. Miranda overand underprotects self-incrimination rights, and is not essential to the
preservation of the Fifth Amendment. The state courts, which have
vast experience with and primary authority for criminal law enforcement, stand ready to provide effective alternatives. They have proven
their commitment to preventing coerced confessions. Yet they remain bound by a rigid uniform federal rule that has outlived its usefulness. It is time for the Court to fulfill the promise it made in Miranda
itself, to permit the states to develop alternatives for protecting the
Fifth Amendment privilege, and to abjure what has become, despite
that Court's promise, a "constitutional straitacket which . . handi94
cap [s] sound efforts at reform."'
B.

DISINCORPORATING MAPP

In 1961, Mapp v. Ohio195 declared that "all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a state court." 19 6 Justice Clark's rather
murky opinion for the Court' 97 seemed to contend that suppression
194 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
195 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
196 Id at 655.
197 At most, only a plurality of four of the Mapp justices endorsed a purely Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule.Justice Black provided the fifth vote in the 5-4 decision, but
as his concurring opinion made clear, he did not agree that the Fourth Amendment mandated exclusion:
I am still not persuaded that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, would be
enough to bar the introduction into evidence against an accused of papers and effects
seized from him in violation of its commands. For the Fourth Amendment does not
itself contain any provision expressly precluding the use of such evidence, and I am
extremely doubtful that such a provision could properly be inferred from nothing
more than the basic command against unreasonable searches and seizures. Reflection
on the problem, however, in the light of cases coming before the Court since Wolf, has
led me to conclude that when the Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable
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was essential to the enforcement of the Fourth Amendment, that
there was no other effective deterrent to noncompliance.1 98 A second
argument was that the rule was essential to judicial integrity, lest governmental institutions appear (by admitting illegally obtained evidence) to endorse constitutional violations. 199 Other contentions in
Mapp in behalf of incorporating the exclusionary rule are subsidiary
200
to the deterrence and integrity rationales.
In the years since Mapp the exclusionary rule has been considerasearches and seizures is considered together with the Fifth Amendment's ban against
compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges which not only justifies
but actually requires the exclusionary rule.
Id. at 661-62 (Black, J., concurring). Perhaps to garner Black's support, there were Fifth
Amendment references in Clark's opinion, id. at 646, 657, but it is not clear that the Fifth
Amendment was essential to the Mapp rule.
198 Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches-state or federal-it was logically and constitutionally
necessary that the exclusion doctrine-an essential part of the right to privacy-be
also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf
case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by Wo/fcould not consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the
unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its
privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of
the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in
the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it.' Elkins v.
United States.
Id. at 655-56.
199 There are those who say, as did Justice (then Judge) Cardozo, that under our
constitutional exclusionary doctrine '(t)he criminal is to go free because the constable
has blundered.' People v. Defore. In some cases this will undoubtedly be the result.
But, as was said in Elkins, 'there is another consideration-the imperative ofjudicial
integrity.' The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free.
Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own
laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence. As Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, said in Olmstead v. United States,: 'Our government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. *
* * If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.'
Id. at 659 (citations omitted).
200 Clark claimed that the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause complemented
the Fourth Amendment suppression doctrine in that both sought to protect privacy. "They
express 'supplementing phases of the same constitutional purpose-to maintain inviolate
large areas of personal privacy.'" Id. at 657. The Court has since repudiated any notion
that the Fifth Amendment protects privacy, as it only guards against compulsion of incriminating testimonial evidence. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). More recently,
the Court renounced any Fifth Amendment justification for the exclusionary rule. "The
Fifth Amendment theory has not withstood critical analysis or the test of time." United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).
Justice Clark also contended that a uniform exclusionary rule would reduce collusive
evasion of the Fourth Amendment by state and federal law enforcers-the "silver platter"
problem. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657-58.
A third subsidiary argument in Mapp was aimed at Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949),
which Mapp partially overruled. Clark contended that the increased adoption of an exclusionary rule by the states in the years since Wofundermined Wol's factual underpinnings,
since Wolfrelied on the paucity of such adoptions to justify its conclusion that the exclusionary rule was not a part of Due Process. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 650-52.
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bly downgraded by the Supreme Court. The Court no longer takes
the judicial integrity rationale seriously, as it considers the matter subsumed under deterrence. 2 01 The deterrence argument is now virtually the sole support for exclusion, which is subject to exceptions
where deterrence seems unachievable.20 2 More significantly, the
Court now finds the exclusionary rule itself to be a mere 'judicially
created remedy" for Fourth Amendment violations "rather than a personal constitutional right."208 This leaves Mapp ripe for
disincorporation.
The first major assault on Mapp came from United States v. Calandra,20 4 which held that a grand jury witness could not refuse to answer

questions based on illegally obtained evidence. In denying that such
questions violated Calandra'sFourth Amendment rights, the Court,
significantly, severed the link between the acquisition of the evidence
and its admission. The illegal search and seizure .was a completed
Fourth Amendment wrong; evidentiary use-to exclude or not-was a
separate question. Admissibility was not a right, it was a matter of utility: if the benefits to the criminal justice system of admitting the evidence outweighed the benefits of suppressing it, the evidence could
be used. In Calandra'swords: "the rule is ajudicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect."20 5 This view was reiterated in Stone v. Powell 20 6
which held that state prisoners who were.,given "full and fair consideration" of their Fourth Amendment claims by the state courts could
not renew those claims on federal habeas corpus review. This time, in
"weighing the utility of the exclusionary rule against the costs of extending it to collateral review" the Court detailed the disadvantages of
suppression.2 07 In United States v. Leon,208 the theory that the exclusionary rule was a mere remedial device, divorced from the Fourth
Amendment proper, reached its apogee. Leon established a good
201

That is, where suppression provides no deterrent against violation of the Fourth

Amendment, admitting the evidence does not offend judicial integrity. United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 n.22 (1984); United States v.Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35 (1976).
202 Leon, 468 U.S. at 897 (creating an exception to the exclusionary rule where officers
act in reasonable reliance on a search warrant later found defective). The most recent
exception was established by Arizona v. Evans, 115 S.Ct. 1185 (1995), where the Court
declined to suppress evidence seized during a search incident to arrest of a motorist where
the officer relied on what later proved to be an erroneous computer report of an outstanding arrest warrant.
203 Leon, 468 U.S. at 906.
204 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
205 Id. at 348.
206 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
207 Id. at 489-90.
208 Leon, 468 U.S. at 897.
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faith exception to the rule when law enforcement agents relied on the
issuance of a search warrant by a judicial officer, despite the fact that
the warrant was held invalid subsequent to the search. Two of the
three Leon dissenters rejected the Fourth Amendment theory endorsed by the Court, and in doing so, made clearjust how shaky is the
constitutional underpinning of the exclusionary rule.2 0 9 Justice Bren-

nan, writing for himself and Justice Marshall, contended that the
Fourth Amendment "restrains the power of the government as a
whole," and that "by admitting unlawfully seized evidence, the judiciary becomes a part of what is in fact a single governmental action prohibited by the terms of the Amendment."2 10 That is, the Fourth
Amendment applies not only to law enforcement agents, as the majority contended, but to the judiciary, which violates its norms by admitting illegally obtained evidence. In sum, Brennan argued that
exclusion was a Fourth Amendment right. By rejecting such a proposition, the Court loosened the rule from its constitutional moorings.
The exclusionary rule is thus in much the same position as the
Miranda doctrine: it is a mere judicial prophylactic to be applied
where it is efficacious. It is, without question, no constitutional right.
Some have suggested that it is therefore beyond the Supreme Court's
authority to impose at all.211 As one analyst-a friend of exclusionasked:
If the exclusionary rule is neither part of nor corollary to the Fourth
Amendment, how does the admission at trial of evidence seized in violadon of the Fourth Amendment violate the Constitution? If such admission does not violate the Constitution, then by virtue of what power does
the Court strike it down?
The Court has frequently linked its enforcement of the exclusionary
rule in the federal courts with its supervisory authority. There is a serious question whether it is a legitimate exercise of supervisory authority
to exclude relevant evidence for the purpose of creating incentives for
209 The third dissenter, Justice Stevens, offered a different approach, one less relevant to
the exclusionary rule issue. He argued that Fourth Amendment violations and admissibility are governed by a reasonableness standard. Searches based on warrants issued without
probable cause were unreasonable and therefore it was contradictory for the Court to conclude that police reliance on such warrants could be reasonable. Id. at 960-61, 966-67.
Regarding the exclusionary rule, Justice Stevens appeared to argue that it was a Fourth
Amendment requirement because nothing else could effectively enforce the provision.
The Fourth Amendment, he said, "requires us to pay" the price of exclusion, lest the courts

countenance "a constitutional violation for which there is no remedy." Id. at 973 n.28, 978,
979.
210 Id. at 932, 933 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a fuller exposition of this view of the
Fourth Amendment, see Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Up From Calandra:The
Exclusionary Rule as a ConstitutionalRequirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251 (1974).
211 Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in CriminalProcedure:A Question of Article 1I Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U.L. Rav. 100 (1985).
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executive officers with respect to matters not before the court. The supervisory authority is not, however, even a candidate in the application
of the exclusionary rule to the states. "[F] ederal courts hold no supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings 21and
may intervene only to
2
correct wrongs of constitutional dimension."
Whether or not the Court has general authority to impose exclusion as a means of enforcing the Fourth Amendment, the question of
its applicability to the states raises a different issue. This is a matter of
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. If the rule cannot survive the
test for disincorporation, Mapp should be reversed. This test requires
first an examination of the meaning and purpose of the Fourth
Amendment right. There follows an empirical and normative assessment of the exclusionary rule: does it in fact promote Fourth Amendment ends, and if so, does that benefit outweigh the harm to Tenth
Amendment values caused by forcing the states to adopt a uniform
procedure? In balancing the Fourth Amendment benefit against the
Tenth Amendment harm we ask whether the Fourth Amendment as
we know it could survive without Mapp. In addition, we inquire
whether the exclusionary rule is the most efficacious way of supporting the right, and whether effective alternative enforcement mechanisms are available. We also consider the availability of independent
state law protection for the privacy right.
"The purpose of the Fourth Amendment," said the Supreme
Court in Calandra, "is to prevent unreasonable governmental intrusions into the privacy of one's person, house, papers, or effects. The
wrong condemned is the unjustified governmental invasion of these
areas of an individual's life. 2 13 For the most part, "governmental intrusion" is a euphemism for searches and seizures by police in the
course of a criminal investigation. Some such invasions are, of course,
essential if evidence of crime is to be obtained and suspects arrested.
The Amendment may be said to balance the need to protect privacy
and the need to enforce the criminal law by prohibiting only "unreasonable" invasions of privacy.
The exclusionary rule seeks to accomplish this end by denying
illegally obtained evidence (and often the fruits derived therefrom) to
the prosecution. Although suppression cannot undo the invasion of
privacy, it is hoped that the impairment of the prosecution's case will
serve as an object lesson to the police to comply with the Fourth
212 Lawrence Crocker, Can the Exclusionay Rule Be Saved, 84J. GluM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
310, 320 (1993) (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982)). Crocker asserts that

there is "implicit" in the Fourth Amendment an "enforcement principle" that supports the
imposition of the exclusionary rule by federal courts. Id. at 327-28.
213 Calandra,414 U.S. at 354.

116
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Amendment in future investigations. Is there empirical proof that the
exclusionary rule actually protects privacy against unjustified invasion
by law enforcement agents? The studies present contradictory or limited evidence. Some show that arrests and seizures of evidence went
down in Mapp's aftermath; others found no such effect.2 1 4 There are
also studies documenting police disrespect if not contempt for Fourth
Amendment values, and there are investigations yielding the opposite
conclusion.2 1 5 A recent investigation indicates that search and seizure
law has become too complex for police compliance; exclusion
notwithstanding, police cannot conform to rules they do not understand.2 1 6 If there is a consensus position, it is, perhaps, that the rule
has been a spur to more widespread and improved police training,
which has in turn promoted compliance in some unmeasurable but
significant way. This is rather weak empirical support for exclusion,
because it is the training, not the exclusion, that affords compliance.
It is not likely that the professional training of American police would
be substantially altered if Mapp were reversed.
The weak empirical support for suppression must be considered
in light of the availability of alternative remedies. Recently, Akhil
Reed Amar presented an impressive argument for a range of civil alternatives, including strict tort liability for police departments, a
Fourth Amendment fund supported by punitive damages, class action
suits, and injunctive and administrative relief.21 7 These proposals

have been criticized as unlikely to be enacted and ineffective if they
214 Compare Bradley C. Canon, Is the ExclusionaryRule in FailingHealth? Some New Dataand
a PleaAgainst a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974) (dramatic post-Mapp decreases
in arrests suggest greater concern about Fourth Amendment) and Dallin H. Oaks, Studying
the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CI. L. REv. 665 (1970) (the rule has little
or no effect on police conduct as measured by the number of arrests or on the amount of
stolen property recovered by the police).
215 CompareJEROME H. SKoLNic, JusTiCE WrrTHOUT TRIAL (2d ed. 1975) (police reject
Fourth Amendment values, view courts as adversaries, and commonly violate search and
seizure rules) and Myron W. Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence:An EmpiricalStudy
of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1016 (1987) (police are not hostile to the
rule and learn the law from their time in court); Myron W. Orfield, Deterrence,Perjury, and
the Heater Factor:An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 75
(1992) (the rule leads to increased police professionalism and greater observance of the
Fourth Amendment).
216 William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluatingthe FourthAmendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L. RErogm 311 (1991)
(deterrence is weak because police are unfamiliar with complex search and seizure law).
Perhaps most disturbing is the conclusion of these investigators that no amount of police
training will eliminate substantial numbers of mistakes about Fourth Amendment law. "It
seems safe to say, however, that there is an uneliminable20 to 30% margin of error among
even well-trained officers as to the legality of intrusions governed by those rules." Id. at
345.
217 Amar, supra note 150.
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would be.2 18 Perhaps so-although it is difficult to predict what
would happen were the rule eliminated, since its obligatory character
discourages alternatives. It is also likely that the public debate surrounding its demise would produce some surprises.
In addition to civil remedy alternatives, the present-day exclusionary rule could be modified by good faith exceptions. Despite the discouragement of the universal federal mandate, some state legislatures
have made serious attempts to alter the rule.2 1 9 Consider, for instance, Utah's ill-fated Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act. 220 The
Utah Supreme Court struck down the Act because it created an exclu22
sionary rule narrower than that currently required by federal law. '
Whereas the federal good faith exception applies to police conduct
undertaken in reliance upon some apparent objectively reasonable
authority, the Utah good faith exception would have applied to all
searches and seizures. On its face, the Utah law called for suppression
of evidence only if the Fourth Amendment violation was "substantial,"
and the burden of proving this, by a preponderance of the evidence,
lies with the defendant. Even a substantial violation would not trigger
an exclusionary remedy if the state could prove that the police acted
in "good faith," which probably means that the officers believed at the
time that their conduct was proper.2 22 The burden of proving good
faith was placed on the prosecution, so that any failure of proof militates against a finding of good faith. Finally, the trial court was obligated to explain the basis for finding good faith; a mere conclusory
ruling would not suffice. By contrast, a decision that the police misconduct was insubstantial, or that the police lacked good faith, need
not be justified.
This Utah scheme would not likely have eliminated suppression,
nor would it have been apt to significantly reduce the judicial resources devoted to search and seizure questions. But it probably
would have markedly diminished the instances in which evidence is
excluded. Its premise is that enforcement of the Fourth Amendment
218 Tracey Maclin, When the Curefor the FourthAmendment Is Worse than the Disease, 68 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1 (1994).
219 Federal legislation establishing a general "good faith" exception to the exclusionary
rule in federal courts cleared the House of Representatives on February 8, 1995, but never
came to a vote in the Senate. EXCLUSIONARY RULE REFORm Acr OF 1995, H.R. 666, 104th
Cong. (1995).
220 I am indebted to Paul Cassell of the University of Utah College of Law for reminding

me about this law. The key portion of the Act was contained in UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-3512(g) (1982), which was declared unconstitutional in State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181
(1987).
221 Mendoza, 748 P.2d at 181.
222 This does not preclude the requirement of a reasonably objective basis for the subjective police belief that their action was lawful.
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can be achieved with less of a cost in suppressed evidence and undermined prosecutions. Does it strike a satisfactory balance between the
need to protect privacy and the need to enforce the criminal law? As
it was never effectively implemented it is probably impossible to say,
but it certainly was a serious, carefully-wrought attempt to grapple
with the problem.
It would seem difficult to conclude that the Mapp rule as presently constructed is the most efficacious way of supporting the right,
and that effective alternative enforcement mechanisms are unavailable. Certainly the Supreme Court has indicated by the growing
number of exceptions it endorses that it does not think the rule indispensable. Despite the acknowledged violation of the Fourth Amendment, evidence is admissible, e.g., in grand jury proceedings, 223 where
police acted in reasonable good faith, 22 4 and where the evidence is
used to impeach the defendant who testifies. 225 Nor can a federal
habeas corpus proceeding reverse a state Fourth Amendment ruling
admitting the evidence. 226 In all of these cases the Court has stated
that the remedial benefits of the rule are outweighed by criminal law
enforcement interests in receiving the evidence.
This brings us to the important role of independent state law in
preserving privacy rights. Largely overlooked in the debates over exclusion is the development of state constitutional exclusionary rules.
As will be shown, at least 74% of the states have acknowledged a statelaw-based suppression policy-a strong indicator of the commitment
of the states to preserving privacy.
To understand the role of the states we must examine the status
of the exclusionary rule in state law in the post-Mapp era. In 1960,
one year prior to the imposition of the federal exclusionary rule upon
the states by Mapp v. Ohio,227 roughly half of the states recognized a
223 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (permitting questions to grand jury
witness based on illegally obtained evidence).
224 Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995) (admitting illegally obtained evidence where
police relied in good faith on an erroneous computer report); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S.
340 (1987) (admitting illegally obtained evidence where police relied in good faith on a
search-authorization statute subsequently invalidated); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984) (admitting illegally obtained evidence where police relied in good faith on a search
warrant subsequently held invalid); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (admitting
illegally obtained evidence where police relied in good faith on a statute subsequently
invalidated).
225 United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (evidence illegally obtained may be
used to impeach the defendant).
226 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (prohibiting exclusion on Fourth Amendment

grounds by federal habeas court where state courts fairly considered the issue).
227 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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state law based exclusionary rule. 228 Some of the excluding states relied upon state statutes 229 or rules of evidence 2 30 rather than a state
constitution. Depending on how one counts, either twenty-six or
twenty-eight states had no exclusionary rule when Mapp was announced.2 3 1 That situation has changed dramatically. In the postMapp era, only one state court of last resort-Maine's-has unambiguously declared that there is no state constitutional exclusionary
rule.23 2 One other state, California, recently adopted a state constitu23 3
tional amendment abrogating that state's exclusionary rules.
But since, and notwithstanding that Mapp forced the rule upon
the states, fifteen states have acknowledged suppression rules on state
constitutional grounds, contrary to their pre-Mapp heritage.23 4 Sometimes the decisions establishing state constitutional exclusionary rules
228 The Appendix to the Opinion of the Court in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224
(1960), indicates that twenty-four of the fifty states admitted illegally obtained evidence
and twenty-six did not. However, the Appendix has been accused of "dubious accounting,"
and it is claimed that "a clear majority of the states (28) generally opposed the exclusionary
rule before Mapp." Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary
Rules Under State Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 751, 793 n.272.
229 E.g., TEx. CODE CRM. P. ANN. art. 38.23 (West 1989).
230 E.g., People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (1955) (adopting an exclusionary rule grounded
upon judicially created rules of evidence subject to legislative revision).
231 See supra note 228.
232 State v. Tarantino, 587 A.2d 1095,1098 (Me. 1991); State v. Foisy, 384 A.2d 42, 44 n.2
(Me. 1978); State v. Stone, 294 A.2d 683, 693 n.15 (Me. 1972). Another conceivable interpretation of these cases is that that there exists a Maine constitutional exclusionary rule,
but that it will not be applied in circumstances where the federal rule will not also be
invoked. This interpretation is at odds with Maine's pre-Mappjurisprudence which denied
altogether the existence of a state constitutional rule. State v. Schoppe, 92 A. 867 (Me.
1915). Courts of other states have declared that they will not apply their state exclusionary
rule where the federal rule does not apply. For instance, the Arizona Supreme Court
stated "that the exclusionary rule to be applied as a matter of state law is no broader than
the federal rule," State v. Bolt, 689 P.2d 519, 527-28 (1984). This "lockstep" statement does
not suggest that Arizona has no exclusionary rule; it implies the contrary. Notwithstanding
this declaration, the Arizona Supreme Court has established broader state constitutional
search and seizure rights, and has excluded evidence where suppression was not required
by the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Ault, 724 P.2d 545 (Ariz. 1986) (establishing a state
constitutional home search exception to the inevitable discovery doctrine).
233 Proposition 8, adopted on June 8, 1982, added to Article I of the state constitution
§ 28, the "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provision, which abrogated a defendant's right to
suppress evidence on state constitutional grounds. See In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744 (Cal.
1985).
234 State v. Bolt, 689 P.2d 519 (Ariz. 1984); People v. Vigil, 729 P.2d 360 (Colo. 1986);
State v. Dukes, 547 A.2d 10 (Conn. 1988); State v.Johnson, 716 P.2d 1288 (Idaho 1986);
State v. Culotta, 343 So. 2d 977 (La. 1976); Commonwealth v. Bishop, 523 N.E.2d 779
(Mass. 1988); State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347 (N.H. 1983); State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820
(NJ. 1987); State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052 (N.M. 1993); People v.Johnson, 488 N.E.2d
439 (N.Y. 1985); State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988); Turner v. City of Lawton, 733
P.2d 375 (Okla. 1986); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991); State v.
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion); State v. Badger, 450 A.2d 336 (Vt.
1982).
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were prompted by rulings that rejected "substantive" Fourth Amendment doctrine and provided broader state rights.2 3 5 In such a circumstance the state suppression rule is logically compelled because the
federal rule does not support exclusion. For instance, the New Hampshire Constitution was interpreted to prohibit drunk driver roadblocks
that are permissible under the Fourth Amendment. 23 6 If evidence obtained from such a roadblock is to be suppressed, the basis for exclusion must be state law as it cannot be federal. Thus, state exclusionary
rules had to be acknowledged if suppression was to be utilized to enforce broader state rights.
On other occasions, state decisions on the exclusionary rule have
been prompted by a desire to repudiate the good faith exception established by United States v. Leon.23 7 Commonwealth v. Edmunds2 38 serves
as a good example. There the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected
the good faith doctrine for the state constitutional search and seizure
provision. Edmunds' rejection of the doctrine perforce implies that a
Pennsylvania constitutional exclusionary rule exists.
Whatever the occasion for these rulings, the significant point is
that more than one-half of the relevant state courts, without Supreme
Court pressure, and indeed, sometimes contrary to Supreme Court
rulings, recognized a state constitutional procedural guarantee of major dimensions. That is, fifteen of the twenty-six (or twenty-eight)
states without an exclusionary rule when Mapp was handed down have
since acknowledged a state law based rule. This demonstrates that the
state courts are serious about protecting defendants' Fourth Amendment rights, frequently, more determined than the United States
Supreme Court itself. If, as is urged here, Mapp were to be reversed,
these fifteen states, along with the twenty-two or more states that
started excluding illegally obtained evidence prior to Mapp-at least
74% of all the states-would continue to exclude evidence.
If Mapp were abandoned, some states would no doubt reconsider
235 E.g., State v. Tapply, 470 A.2d 900, 905 (N.H. 1984) (per curiam) (seizure of defendant, unlawful by state constitutional standards, tainted his subsequent statements); State v.
Koppel, 499 A.2d 977, 983 (N.H. 1985) (drunk driver roadblock, illegal under state constitution, taints evidence found in automobile); State v. Chaisson, 486 A.2d 297, 304 (N.H.
1984) (home arrest violative of state constitution taints property seized on premises); State
v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347 (N.H. 1983) (reversing trial court decision to admit evidence where
seizure violated state constitutional plain view standards).
236 Compare Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (drunk
driver roadblocks do not violate the Fourth Amendment) with State v. Koppel, 499 A.2d
977, 983 (N.H. 1985) (drunk driver roadblock, illegal under state constitution, taints evidence found in automobile).
237 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
238 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991) (rejecting on state constitutional grounds the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule established in Leon).
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their position, and perhaps develop more effective and less costly alternatives to exclusion in the true Brandeisian laboratory tradition.
Others would modify the rule, as Utah tried to do, 23 9 with a good faith
exception. Still others would no doubt be resolute in maintaining exclusion exactly as is. Whatever course they may take, however, there is
little justification for not trusting the states. The state courts and legislatures are in the best position to determine whether or not exclusion
of illegally obtained evidence is the most efficacious remedy for police
misconduct. The state judiciary especially has demonstrated its ability
to balance the need to enforce the criminal law against the privacy
rights of the individual. Should a state not meet its obligations to develop a suitable apparatus to protect substantive Fourth Amendment
rights the Supreme Court will stand ready to intervene. Wolf v. Colorado2 40 remains the law: the "core" of the Amendment is a part of Due
Process, and if a state fails in its duty, the Court has authority to step
in and demand action. Due process should be considered satisfied,
however, where a state can demonstrate that it has a bona fide worka2 41
ble mechanism for enforcing the amendment.
Thus, neither Mapb nor Miranda are essential to the survival of a
fundamental right. And if this is true, how can they be said to be
requisites of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process? Both cases should
be reversed. But even if they are not overturned, the Supreme Court
should signal its willingness to apply disincorporation analysis whenever there is a challenge to a quasiconstitutional rule that has been
imposed upon the states. The implications of doing so extend well
beyond the Mapp and Mirandarules, and the last section of this article
explores those implications.
V.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF DISINCORPORATION

Aside from the obvious impact of relieving the states from having
to enforce disincorporated procedures, such as the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule or the Mirandarule, disincorporation will provide a number of broad benefits. After these are enumerated, I shall
consider the implications of a regime of disincorporation for other
See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
240 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
241 Perhaps the Mapp exclusionary regime could be reversed in stages, with the Court
announcing that whereas the Fourteenth Amendment no longer demands a uniform national rule of exclusion, it requires a workable mechanism to enforce Fourth Amendment
strictures. This would give the states-especially those states that have no exclusionary
rule, and therefore no remedy for Fourth Amendment violations-time to develop alternatives, with the Supreme Court standing ready to review state efforts through the appellate
process. The Court could continue to apply the federal exclusionary rule to those states
that have no machinery or no adequate machinery for Fourth Amendment enforcement.
239
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requirements of due process.
A.

ADVANTAGES

OF DISINCORPORATION

Disincorporation will provide at least five notable benefits. First,
it will strengthen the authority of the Supreme Court by limiting it to
its traditional and proper role of constitutional interpretation. It will
eliminate anomalous Court decisions like Mapp and Mirandathat impose procedures upon the states while at the same time denying that
these procedures have constitutional warrant. While the Court will
retain authority to broadly construe the Constitution, it will have to
justify through the application of a disincorporation analysis the imposition of quasiconstitutional procedures upon the states.
Second, disincorporation will encourage truer, perhaps even
more rights-protective, interpretations of the Bill of Rights by a
Supreme Court freed from the distortions of having to formulate nationwide rules. It has been observed that the Court is "hesitant to
impose on a national level far-reaching constitutional rules binding
on each and every state." 242 In his unsuccessful campaign against the
incorporation process, Justice John Marshall Harlan frequently
warned about the dilution of federal standards in order to establish
them nationwide.2 43 It is not too late to undo some of the damage.
As the Court reduces state obligations through disincorporation it facilitates broader Bill of Rights interpretations. Shorn of the necessity
of compelling the states to exclude illegally seized evidence, for example, the Court could enlarge and strengthen privacy rights. To be
sure, under a disincorporation regime the states will still be obligated
to enforce fundamental rights, but the means of enforcement will
more often be theirs to choose. Knowing this, the Court will be under
less pressure to tailor rights out of federalism concerns.
Third, disincorporation will help restore the Tenth Amendment
2 44 It will
to its proper place in the American constitutional scheme.
reestablish state authority in criminal justice, a traditional area of state
control. Defining and enforcing the criminal law is a reserved power
of the states, while the federal government is limited to actions within
242 State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 800 (N.J. 1990), quoting State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952
(NJ. 1982) (Pashman, J., concurring). See also Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's
Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme CourtReasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REv. 353,
389 (1984) ("federalism concerns" make Supreme Courtjustices reluctant to apply a uniform national mandate to a diverse group of state governments).
243 E.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 808 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 182 (1968) (Harlan,J., dissenting); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,
14-15, 27-28 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
244 See supra note 139.
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the scope of its delegated powers.2 46 Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process obligates the states to enforce fundamental rights and those
procedures essential to their maintenance, but the Tenth Amendment protects each state's authority to determine for itself its substantive and procedural criminal law. There is no warrant for imposing
upon the states every criminal procedure rule that five Supreme Court
justices approve, without regard to the relationship of that rule to a
fundamental constitutional right. By acknowledging Tenth Amendment principles, the Supreme Court reinstates a much-ignored
stepchild of the Bill of Rights and furthers the trend toward returning
to the states authority over matters left to them by the Constitution.
Fourth, disincorporation will encourage state experimentation in
a traditional area of state control. Despite some recent encouraging
news about a dip in crime rates, 246 criminal law enforcement is an
area that has been marked by a distinct lack of success. Why not permit some Brandeisian activity in the one policy sphere that the states
know better than anyone else?24 7 Though the exercise of federal au-

thority in criminal law enforcement has grown enormously, it still remains true that fewer than 3% of the felony prosecutions, and under
1% of the misdemeanor accusations, are processed in the federal sys245 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 n.3 (1995) ("Under our federal system,
the " ' S tates possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.'" Brecht
v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)); See
also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945) (plurality opinion) ("Our national
government is one of delegated powers alone. Under our federal system the administration of criminal justice rests with the States except as Congress, acting within the scope of
those delegated powers, has created offenses against the United States.").
246 FEDERAL BuREAu OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPr OFJUSTICE, FEDERAL BuREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS,

1994, CRIME

IN THE UNITED STATES

(1995) (crime rate

dropped 2% from 1993).
247 The advantages of decentralizing criminal justice policy have often been noted. Sara
Sun Beale recently wrote:
A decentralized federal system is efficient; it permits criminal justice policy to be tailored to local conditions and policy preferences; and it furthers political accountability. The variety inherent in the federal system also permits desirable
experimentation. Indeed, many of the most promising current trends in criminal enforcement began at the state and local levels, including specialized drug courts, community policing, boot camps, and sentencing guidelines....
Many efficiency concerns favor state and local rather than federal criminal enforcement. Given the vastly larger size of the state judiciary, state courts are nearly
always geographically closer, and hence more convenient, for victims, wimesses, jurors, and defendants. The states, which have long had large criminal dockets, typically
have developed a comprehensive range of social service and outreach programs that
are lacking in the federal courts. Finally, state corrections programs also have built-in
advantages over their federal counterparts. Because state corrections institutions are
located closer to offenders' home communities, they facilitate contact with family and
reintegration into the community....
Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principlesto Define the ProperLimitsforFederal
CriminaiJurisdiction,46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 993-94 (1995).
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tem.248 Federal constitutional criminal procedure is a dead weight on
the states; they cannot and (at least so far) the Supreme Court will not
change it. Yet even its strongest supporters must concede that the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, the Mirandadoctrine, and the
many subsidiary criminal procedure rules propounded by the Court
are often, at best, unfortunate compromises. Present-day incorporation doctrine leaves too little room for state experimentation; if there
are better ways to regulate the police than by the exclusion of competent evidence the states are nonetheless forbidden from substituting
them. The states have shown both their willingness and their ability to
enact criminal procedure reforms. Given the individual rights track
record of the state courts in the last several decades there is little to
risk and much to gain from permitting state experimentation in this
area.
Fifth and finally, disincorporation will enhance the role of state
law, including state constitutional law, and raise the esteem of state
courts. State constitutional law serves an important function: the ordering of state governmental authority and the protection of individual rights against state governmental abuse. A hyperinflated due
process jurisprudence has marginalized both the law and its primary
expositors, the state courts.2 49 It has compelled state courts to enforce
multifarious federal procedural requirements whether or not they are
essential to preserving fundamental rights. Although state constitutional law can provide rights narrower than federal guarantees, such
state law is unenforceable under the command of the Supremacy
Clause-even if the federal rights are not properly a part of due process. Disincorporation will free state constitutional law to develop
more faithfully to state needs and state constitutional history, unencumbered by federal procedures that should no longer be imposed
upon the states. Disincorporation will prompt a full flowering of state
constitutional law as it assumes its proper place as the principal limit
on state government. The state courts will receive enhanced respect
248 KAMIsAR Er AL, supranote 155, at 2. Regarding the growth of federal criminal law,
Beale noted that "[b]etween 1980 and 1992, the number of criminal cases filed in the
federal courts increased by 70 percent (from 27,968 to 47,472) and the number of defendants prosecuted rose 78 percent (from 38,033 to 67,632)." Beale, supra note 247, at 984.
249 Gardner, supra note 11, at 805-10, rejected the notion that incorporation stifled the
development of independent state constitutional lawmaking. As he observed, state courts
could have broadened rights on state grounds prior to incorporation, or could have seized
the rights-enhancing initiative once the incorporation process began. Id. at 807. Gardner
did not consider, however, that the post-incorporation era, which continued long after the
1960s, routinely imposed on state courts an abundance of federal procedures with dubious
value in preserving fundamental rights. The development of an independent state constitutional law that denies these procedural "rights" is effectively prohibited by the
Supremacy Clause.
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(and, of course, scrutiny) as state law gains in significance.
B.

THE IMPACT OF DISINCORPORATION ON OTHER CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE RULES

Perhaps one of the principal obstacles to disincorporation will be
the fear of opening the floodgates to challenges to much of the constitutional criminal procedure law developed since the 1960's. Admittedly, there is some justification for this fear, as one cannot predict
with perfect accuracy which procedural decisions the Court will disincorporate. Application of the disincorporation test-the essentiality
of a procedure to the administration of a fundamental right-entails a
certain amount of subjectivity and therefore unpredictability. However, virtually all legal doctrines have a certain unpredictable quality;
prior to the 1960's, who could have predicted that due process would
come to be a shorthand for virtually the entire Bill of Rights? In any
event, what is to be feared from inviting disincorporation challenges?
The state courts are quite adequate to the task of coping with another
period of legal uncertainty, and if a rule is shown to be inessential
there is no good reason for imposing it upon them.
Notwithstanding the uncertainties, there are some proceduresobviously the Mapp and Mirandarules-that are so patently removed
from the core constitutional rights they are supposed to protect that
they virtually invite disincorporation challenges. Other rules appear
to be in the same category. A Sixth Amendment case, United States v.
Wade,250 comes readily to mind. In Wade, the Court established a right
to counsel for suspects placed in a lineup, and a per se exclusionary
rule for violations of this right. It is difficult to reconcile such a rule
with the traditional Sixth Amendment guarantee of the assistance of
counsel in providing a defense.2 5 1 The role of the attorney at a police
identification is not to provide professional assistance to an accused in
an adversarial setting, but rather to observe and deter lineup irregularities.2 52 It is more accurate to say that counsel's presence is in250 388 U.S. 218 (1967). In Kirby v. illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), the Court limited the
Wade right to postindictment lineups, explaining that the Sixth Amendment is not applicable prior to the initiation of adversaryjudicial proceedings.
251 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
2-52 In another identification context, the Supreme Court said that counsel was not
needed to compensate for the lay suspect's unfamiliarity with the law or his confrontation
with a professional adversary. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (no right to counsel at postindictment photo identification proceeding). That the role of counsel at lineups
is primarily as an observer was suggested by Justice Stewart, concurring in Ash. "The
[Wade] Court held, therefore, that counsel was required at a lineup, primarily as an observer, to ensure that defense counsel could effectively confront the prosecution's evidence at trial. Attuned to the possibilities of suggestive influences, a lawyer could see any
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tended to protect defendant's confrontation rights, 253 somewhat the
way a lawyer is provided by Mirandafor the protection of Fifth Amendment rights. Thus, Wade appears to have established another prophylactic rule, 25 4 inviting inquiry into whether it is essential to a

fundamental right. A strong case has been made that the per se exclusionary aspect of Wade is especially ripe for reversal, since such a rule,
if applied, is virtually fatal to the obtaining of a conviction, and the
Court never even considered the adequacy of alternative remedies.2 55
But in order to determine if the Wade rule is truly essential to the
survival of fundamental Sixth Amendment rights the Supreme Court
must consider possible alternatives. It should ask if the Wade rule is
the most efficacious way of supporting the confrontation right, and if
there are effective alternative options available to the states. The
Court should not simply continue to assume that the Wade prophylactic is vital to the preservation of a fundamental right. Because Wade is
a quasiconstitutional rule, the Supreme Court should have to demonstrate its essentiality through the kind of disincorporation analysis suggested in Part IV of this article.
Supreme Court decisions establishing what may be called subsidiary procedural rules for the administration of rights provide another
fruitful area for disincorporation. The Bill of Rights is silent about
such matters as, e.g., the burden of proving a violation, the standard
applicable to that burden, whether or not a right may be waived, who
must participate in the waiver, whether or not a violation can be harmless error, the standard for measuring harmless error, etc.2 56 Are the

rules developed by the Supreme Court on these matters essential to
maintaining fundamental rights? It is probably true that the states will
have to develop some rules along these lines in order to protect fundamental rights, but does it follow that in each instance only one uniform national rule can do the job?
25 7
Consider the issue of harmless error. In Chapman v. California,
the Supreme Court held that a federal constitutional error in a state
criminal trial requires reversal unless the government can establish
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Is this stanunfairness at a lineup, question the witnesses about it at trial, and effectively reconstruct
what had gone on for the benefit of the jury or trialjudge." Id. at 324 (footnote omitted).
253 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him...."
254 However, Grano says that the Court does not seem to consider Wade a prophylactic
rule. GRANo, supranote 150, at 179 n.60.
255 Joseph D. Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain
Against the Dangerof Convicting the Innocent , 72 MICH. L. Ruv. 717, 791 (1974).
256 This list is suggested by GRANo, supra note 150, at 192.
257 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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dard vital to the protection of fundamental rights? The Chapmanmajority hinted that Congress could modify the rule,258 raising doubts

about its constitutional grounding, and Justice Harlan dissented, objecting that the Court had no authority to prescribe such quasiconstitutional rules of procedure for the states.2 59 More recently, one
scholar concluded that the Chapman rule was a species of "constitutional common law."260 But it was Justice White, dissenting in a 1993
harmless error case, Brecht v. Abrahamson,26 1 who hit the nail on the
head:
Chapman, it is true, never expressly identified the'source of this harmlesserror standard. But, whether the standard be characterized as a "necessary rule" of federal law... or criticized as a quasi-constitutional doctrine....

the Court clearly viewed it as essential to the safeguard of

federal constitutional rights. Otherwise, there 2would
have been nojusti62
fication for imposing the rule on state courts.
Precisely! Perhaps it is true, as Justice White suggested, that the
Chapman rule is an essential safeguard, or perhaps alternative formulations, such as the one approved by the Brecht majority ("substantial
and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict")
are sufficient. But surely, especially in light of Brecht, it is correct to
say that unless it is demonstrated that some harmless error rule is "essential to the safeguard of federal constitutional rights" there is no
justification for imposing it on the state courts. It is incumbent upon
a majority of the Supreme Court to provide this demonstration, or to
permit the state courts develop their own harmless error rules.
A word or two on those areas of criminal procedure law that do
not lend themselves to disincorporation challenge. There are numerous Supreme Court cases that directly construe incorporated clauses
of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments. These decisions
may be controversial, and many commentators are persuaded that
they are mistaken, but that alone does not make them eligible for
disincorporation. So long as the decision is a constitutional, rather
Id. at 21.
Id. at 46 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
260 DanielJ. Meltzer, Harmless Error and ContitutionalRmedie, 61 U. Cmu. L.Rxv. 1, 5
(1994). Regarding constitutional common law, see supra notes 145-46 and accompanying
text.
258
259

261 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (applying, in federal habeas corpus review, a harmless error

standard less onerous than Chapman's).
262 Id. at 1726 (WhiteJ, dissenting). Justice Blackmunjoined this opinion, andJustice
Souter, joining in part, did not object to this portion of it. Justice O'Connor, dissenting
separately, agreed with White's reading of Chapmam "[A]sJusdce White observes ....one
searches the majority opinion in vain for a discussion of the basis for Chapman's harmlesserror standard. We are left to speculate whether Chapman is the product of constitutional
command or a judicial construct that may overprotect constitutional rights." Id. at 652
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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than a quasiconstitutional ruling, it should be considered immune.
This includes the many search and seizure rulings of the Court deciding, for example, whether or not an automobile search, or a stop and
63
frisk comported with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.2
It encompasses too the myriad determinations that confessions were
or were not compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.2 6

Like them or not, these cases are determining the outer

boundaries of an incorporated fundamental right. They are part of
the Supreme Court's mandate to interpret the Constitution, to tell us
the meaning of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. In a wholly different category, however, are those prophylactic, quasiconstitutional or
constitutional common law determinations that are not directly construing constitutional provisions. Whether or not the Court has Article III authority to impose these upon the federal government, it
should have to demonstrate their essentiality to a fundamental right
2 65
to justify their continued inclusion in due process.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The incorporation process that flowered in the 1960's was based
upon an assumption that the states, including the state courts, were
insufficiently protective of individual rights. Empirical studies demonstrate that this assumption is no longer valid. The state constitutional
renaissance, in which the state courts established either the same or
broader-than-federal rights, demolishes any lingering notions that the
state bench is insensitive to rights. Now that this historical foundation
for incorporation has eroded, its constitutional-theoretical foundation
merits re-examination. In the post-incorporation era, the Supreme
Court simply assumed that its many Bill of Rights rulings were applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. This assumption was unwarranted. Some of the Court's procedural rulesMirandds and Mapp's being especially noteworthy-are not directly
based on constitutional provisions. Indeed, the Court has explicitly
declared that these procedures are not constitutional rights.
Although some commentators questioned the Court's authority to establish quasiconstitutional rights, and others defended the development by relying on such concepts as "constitutional common law," it
appears that no one has seen fit to re-examine the incorporation doctrine. But if a procedure is not demanded by the Bill of Rights, and is
263 E.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) ("automobile exception" search);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk).
264 See e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (coercive police activity is a requisite for involuntariness under the due process clause).
265 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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not essential to the safeguarding of such a right then it has no place in
due process. Whatever the Court's authority to broadly interpret constitutional provisions, it has no authority to impose procedures on the
states that cannot be shown to be essential to a fundamental right. It
is a matter of the scope of due process and the Tenth Amendment
authority of the states. The Court should therefore selectively disincorporate-excise from the Fourteenth Amendment-those procedures that are not demonstrably essential to the safeguarding of
fundamental rights.
Although disincorporation will seem radical at first blush, it actually offers a compromise that should be acceptable to both liberals
and conservatives. For years conservatives have railed against Mapp
and Miranda, while liberals defended these decisions. Disincorporation provides a solution: don't abolish the exclusionary rule and Miranda; but don't jam them down the throats of all fifty states either.
Let the state courts decide for themselves whether or not to adopt
such rules. They may well establish similar rights on independent
state law grounds; to a greater extent than is generally acknowledged,
they have already done so.
Likewise, rights advocates have vigorously defended broad
Supreme Court authority to interpret the Bill of Rights, while skeptical opponents sounded alarms at such judicial activism. Disincorporation's answer: don't cut back on Supreme Court authority to broadly
interpret the Constitution, but insist that the Court justify imposing
quasiconstitutional requirements on the states.
Disincorporation poses no threat to fundamental rights or their
application to the States. It demands only that we refrain from saddling the states with procedures that are not essential to such rights.
It gives the state courts-now proven rights-protectors-the choice of
how best to preserve fundamental rights, and invites the Supreme
Court to judge if they are doing so in good faith.
Disincorporation will enable the full development of state constitutional law, as it assumes its rightful place as the primary source of
state criminal defendants' rights. It will herald the true emancipation
of the state bench from the ,Supreme Court's guardianship. And it
will permit the state laboratories to test out alternative approaches to
criminal procedure. Constitutional theory, the historical situation,
and criminal justice policy all point to disincorporation analysis. How
fitting it would be if the Supreme Court recognized this in time for
the new century.

